GIVING EX-FELONS THE RIGHT TO
Scott M. Bennett*
Cite as 6 Cal. Crim. Law Rev.
Pincite using paragraph numbers, e.g.
6 Cal. Crim. Law Rev. 1, ¶11
¶1 All but two states punish convicted felons
by taking away their right to vote, either for a limited period or for the rest
of their lives. As a result, 3.9 million adult Americans – about 2 percent
of the voting-age population – have lost their right to participate in a
fundamental part of the political process. The racial impact of these laws
is even more staggering: 13 percent of black men in America cannot vote because
of a felony conviction.
¶2 There are several possible grounds for a
court challenge to felon disenfranchisement laws, including the 14th
Amendment, the Voting Rights Act, and international law. It also might be possible for Congress to
permit convicts to vote in federal elections. However, the most effective way to
abolish felon disenfranchisement laws is probably to take the debate to state
legislatures, which enacted the laws in the first place. This article maps
out a strategy for persuading state legislators to give ex-felons the right to
¶3 Advocates for ex-felons must be able to
explain the impact of felon disenfranchisement laws to state legislators and
their constituents. Part I of this paper examines the nature of the
problem. It gives a brief history of disenfranchisement laws and details
their current impact upon the population in general and people of color in
¶4 Conservative interest groups will arm
state legislators with a number of arguments as to why ex-felons should not have
the right to vote. Part II explains why there is no persuasive reason to
exile ex-felons from the political process.
¶5 It is not enough for advocates to
explain why felon disenfranchisement laws are bad; they also must be able to
give legislators persuasive reasons to give ex-felons the right to vote.
Part III examines the five most persuasive, non-racial arguments against
disenfranchisement that appeared in the news media in states that recently
relaxed restrictions on ex-felons’ right to vote. It details the limits of
these arguments and suggests ways for advocates to make them resonate on a
deeper level with legislators and their constituents.
Nature of the Problem
A. A Brief History of Felon
Felon disenfranchisement laws are an unpleasant
inheritance from the past. These laws existed as far back as ancient
Greece. Later in England, felon
disenfranchisement was part of the process of “civil death,” which stripped
convicted felons of many civil rights. The American Colonies imported felon
disenfranchisement laws from Britain. Disenfranchisement laws “gained new
political salience at the end of the nineteenth century when disgruntled whites
in a number of Southern states adopted them and other ostensibly race-neutral
voting restrictions in an effort to exclude blacks from the vote.” Felon disenfranchisement laws,
therefore, exist in America today because of historical inertia or racial
prejudice, and not because of any rational policy
B. The Impact of Felon Disenfranchisement
In a debate during the 2000 Democratic presidential
primary campaign, candidates Al Gore and Bill Bradley revealed that they knew
little about the current state of disenfranchisement laws. Gore stated: “Now, the principle that
convicted felons do not have a right to vote is an old one. It is well
established…I believe in the established principle that felonies - certainly
heinous crimes - should result in a disenfranchisement.” Gore seemed to favor permanent
disenfranchisement, a harsh approach that is the law in only a handful of
states. He also overlooked the startling racial disparities in
disenfranchisement, which contrasts sharply with the commitment to
African-Americans he claimed earlier in the debate, when he insisted that South
Carolina remove the Confederate flag from its capitol building.
¶8 Bradley did
slightly better. He acknowledged racial disparities in incarceration
rates, then stated: “If someone is in on a nonviolent offense, and comes out and
is able to go straight for two years, three years, I think that that person
ought to be able to wipe his record clean and start the day anew. And
that's what I would attempt to achieve.” That approach is also harsher than the
laws of most states: all but 13 states restore all felons’ right to vote once
they have completed their sentences. Neither candidate, moreover, seemed
to understand that the states, and not the federal government, are the source of
felon disenfranchisement laws.
If two candidates for the presidency, who presumably
are well informed about the issues, need a lesson about disenfranchisement laws,
it is clearly important for advocates who want to abolish these laws to arm
themselves with the information necessary to educate state legislators and the
public about the nature of the problem.
¶10 Nearly all states restrict the voting rights of convicted
felons. Only two states permit convicted felons to vote while in prison. Thirty-five states continue to
disenfranchise felons after they leave prison, while they are still on
parole. Thirteen states disenfranchise some ex-felons who have fully
completed their sentences, including probation or parole. In eight states,
those convicted of a felony permanently lose their right to vote. 
¶11 The number of people disenfranchised reveals the magnitude of the
problem. It is important for advocates to focus on these numbers in order
to show that this is not merely a problem confined to a small segment of the
population. In 1998, The Sentencing Project and Human Rights Watch
released a report that estimated the numerical impact of state
disenfranchisement laws. According to that report, 3.9 million
Americans have currently or permanently lost their right to vote because of a
felony conviction. That number is 2 percent of the voting-age population
of the United States, which is significant on its own but takes on
a new importance in light of the 2000 presidential election: George Bush won by
approximately 537 votes in Florida, where at least 200,000 ex-felons could not
¶12 The numbers also show the impact of permanent
disenfranchisement. In the United States, 1.4 million ex-felons cannot go
to the polls, even though they have already completed their sentences. In
five states, at least 4 percent of adults have permanently lost the right to
¶13 The raw number of people disenfranchised is shocking in a
democracy. Even more appalling is the disparate racial impact of
disenfranchisement. Of the 3.9 million disenfranchised, 1.4 million are
black men – 13 percent of the black men in America. That is a large portion of the black
male population, and even larger in relation to the total number of black male
voters. While 1.4 million black men are disenfranchised, only 4.6 million
voted in the 1996 federal election. If all those currently disenfranchised
could vote, and exercised that right, the nationwide voting strength of black
men would increase by 30 percent.
¶14 Statistics from individual states paint a startling picture of the
effects of disenfranchisement laws upon racial minorities. In Alabama and
Florida, 31 percent of all black men are permanently disenfranchised. One in four black men are permanently
disenfranchised in Iowa, Mississippi, Virginia and Wyoming. And the situation could get worse:
“Given current rates of incarceration, three in ten of the next generation of
black men will be disenfranchised at some point in their lifetime. In
states with the most restrictive voting laws, 40 percent of African American men
are likely to be permanently disenfranchised.”
¶15 A disparate racial impact, by itself, might not be a problem.
There is an argument that if minorities commit felonies at a higher rate than
whites, then it logically follows that more minorities will be convicted, and
therefore more will lose the right to vote. Even if it is true that a higher crime
rate among minorities is responsible for some of the disparities in
incarceration, as “most criminal scholars agree,” the alarming rate at which black men in
America are losing their right to vote raises “serious questions about the
fairness of our criminal justice policy.”
¶16 Professor David Cole suggests that reversing the statistics makes
the problem clear. Imagine the public reaction if 13
percent of white men in America could not vote because of a felony conviction,
and as many as 31 percent of white males were disenfranchised in some
states. There would be enormous public support to abolish
disenfranchisement laws, and conservative and liberal politicians alike would
make it a top priority. Regardless of the cause, the mere fact that black
men in America are disenfranchised at a rate seven times the national
average indicates a serious problem that requires
Arguments for Disenfranchising Felons are not Persuasive
¶17 Advocates must be able to disarm the arguments of the
opposition. Fortunately, there is no persuasive reason to deprive all
ex-felons of their right to vote. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, in fact, has noted that it is difficult to identify any reason
to disenfranchise felons.  This section examines the most common
arguments in favor of disenfranchisement and their flaws.
¶18 One argument for disenfranchisement is that states should be able
to keep ex-felons from voting in order to prevent election-related offenses. According to this view, ex-felons have
demonstrated a tendency to violate the law, and therefore are more likely to
violate the laws that govern elections and voting.
¶19 It is questionable whether this is a realistic concern. The
fact that a person chose to commit one crime does not necessarily make him or
her more likely to commit a different kind of crime in the future.
Consider a concrete example: It would be hard to claim with a straight face that
someone who cheated on tax returns would be more likely than anyone else to
commit murder. There is simply no logical connection between tax evasion
and murder. Likewise, there is no logical connection between most felonies
and election-related crimes. As one commentator has written, “it is
difficult to imagine why a car thief or drug dealer would have an interest in,
or knowledge of, committing electoral fraud.” The election-fraud argument has some
strength in the abstract, but seems absurd in the world of concrete
examples. The best way for advocates to counter it is by using concrete
examples such as the ones given above.
¶20 Even if it were true that ex-felons are more likely to commit
election-related offenses, current disenfranchisement laws are clearly both
over-inclusive and under-inclusive. Disenfranchisement laws are
over-inclusive because many states disenfranchise all convicted felons,
regardless whether their crimes have any logical relationship to elections or
voting. Disenfranchisement laws are also
under-inclusive because many states that disenfranchise ex-felons do not take
the right to vote away from those convicted of election-related offenses. Blanket disenfranchisement provisions,
therefore, are not an effective way to protect the electoral system. A
better method would be to limit disenfranchisement to those convicted of
offenses that have some logical relationship to voting and elections.
Irresponsible People from Voting
¶21 Another argument for disenfranchisement is that, by committing a
crime, ex-felons have shown that they are not responsible enough to vote.
This argument surfaced multiple times during the
testimony regarding House Bill 906, which would have given ex-felons the right
to vote in federal elections. Todd Gaziano of the Heritage Foundation
stated: “Criminal disenfranchisement allows citizens to decide law enforcement
issues without the dilution of voters who are deemed…to be less trustworthy.” Roger Clegg of the Center for Equal
Opportunity echoed this concern: “We do not want people voting who are not
trustworthy and loyal to our republic … Criminals are, in the aggregate, less
likely to be trustworthy, good citizens.” This argument also has been popular in
states that have recently expanded the voting rights of ex-felons. In
Virginia, for example, one state senator argued: “Just because you have spent
time in prison does not mean your judgment has changed.”
¶22 This argument is similar to the claim that ex-felons are more
likely to commit election-related crimes. It is reasonable when phrased in
abstract terms, but crumbles when it runs into concrete examples.
Consider, for example, the convicted car thief or drug dealer. Stealing
the car or selling the drugs was certainly a bad choice. There is no
logical connection, however, between the choice to steal a car or sell drugs and
the choices between competing candidates and issues that face voters in the
¶23 Even if the decision to commit a crime reveals a fundamental
inability to make a reasonable choice in the voting booth, that flaw is not
necessarily permanent. Past behavior does not always indicate present
potential. One purpose of criminal punishment, in
fact, is to teach offenders to make responsible choices in the future.
Convicts who have served their time, therefore, should be able to make better
decisions than in the past. Participating in the political process also
might facilitate the rehabilitative process by instilling a sense of
responsibility in ex-offenders. 
¶24 The best way to deal with this argument is to shift the debate to
concrete terms. It is easy for legislators to claim that those who choose
to commit crimes generally have made bad decisions. It is impossible,
however, for those same legislators to produce a persuasive argument as to why
the convicted drug dealer cannot go into the voting booth and make a reasonable
choice between Al Gore and George W. Bush. As one commentator has stated,
“No one has put forward a convincing reason explaining why [ex-felons] cannot
make political decisions just as well or badly as the rest of us can.”
C. Prevent Harmful
Changes to the Law
¶25 Another argument is that disenfranchisement is necessary to prevent
harmful changes to the law. The concern is that ex-felons would alter the
content or administration of the criminal law by electing officials who would be
soft on crime. The most effective form of this
argument frames the issue in terms of the rights of non-felons:
"Given that many poor and minority communities
are ravaged by crime, [enfranchisement] could have a perverse effect on the
ability of law abiding citizens to reduce the deadly and debilitating crime in
their communities…[I]t could be argued that those communities that currently
have the highest level of state disenfranchisement are the most protected by
those laws and would be the most adversely affected by the vote of “unreformed”
convicts in their communities."
the Connecticut legislature was considering a bill that gave ex-felons the right
to vote after release from prison, an opponent of the measure offered a less
academic but more viscerally appealing version of this argument: “I don’t want
the convicted felons to determine our policies on criminal justice. That’s
my opinion, but one I think a lot of people share.”
¶26 The first problem with this argument is practical. There is
no realistic possibility that allowing ex-felons to vote would alter the content
or administration of most of the criminal law. Even if all convicted
felons were firmly committed to using their votes to elect soft-on-crime judges,
district attorneys and other officials, there is no practical way they could
accomplish this. One commentator gives a particularly amusing illustration
of the difficulties ex-felons would face:
"[L]et us imagine what the process might look
like. Suppose…a group of burglars in the neighborhood wants to reduce the
criminal penalties for burglary. First, they would have to field a
candidate (either one of their own or someone else who is “pro-burglar”) to run
for state office. They would then have to run a rather effective campaign
in this era of “get tough” politics in order to secure 51 percent of the vote
for their candidate. Once elected, the new office-holder would have to
convince a majority of the state legislature and the governor to support
legislation to reduce penalties for burglary."
bottom line is that there is no realistic possibility that convicted felons
could alter the content or administration of most aspects of the criminal law,
even if they wanted to, because there is not enough support for those changes
among the rest of the political community.
¶27 Giving ex-felons the right to vote, however, could lead to limited
changes in the criminal law because it could shift the political balance within
an area. There is widespread concern among Republicans that ex-felons are
more likely to vote Democratic. The head of the New Mexico Republican
Party, for example, expressed concern that if the legislature gave ex-felons the
right to vote, “those eligible under the bill would register with the Democratic
Party.” If ex-felons are more likely to vote
Democratic, then giving them the right to vote could give shift control of some
jurisdictions to Democrats. That political shift could lead to changes in
the criminal law, but only with regard to issues on which Republicans and
Democrats tend to disagree. There is no realistic chance, for example,
that a Democratic legislature would decriminalize burglary. A more
realistic possibility is that a Democratic legislature would scale back harsh
drug laws, by decriminalizing simple possession or eliminating mandatory minimum
sentences. This is not a problem, but merely the
democratic process in action. Giving ex-felons the right to vote would
simply allow them to participate in the political process, and perhaps become
part of a majority that would shape policy. That is what democracy is all
about: giving all citizens an equal voice in the process that creates the laws
that they must obey.
¶28 No matter how ex-felons would vote, disenfranchising them because
of their opinions contradicts important democratic principles. A democracy
is supposed to be a government of the people. This means that citizens
determine the role of government, and perhaps the most important voice that the
people have in this process is the right to vote. Preventing ex-felons from voting
distorts the democratic process because it excludes a group that might have a
unique perspective. As one commentator has written, “[e]xcluding from the
electorate those who have felt the sting of the criminal law obviously skews the
politics of criminal justice toward one side of the debate.” Fencing out ex-felons, therefore, harms
democracy. Beyond the normative appeal of this argument, commentators have
suggested that disenfranchising felons because of how they might vote violates
the Supreme Court’s holding in Carrington v. Rash that “ ‘fencing out’
from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may vote
is constitutionally impermissible.”
Punishment for Crime
¶29 The final argument for disenfranchisement is that it is part of
legitimate punishment for crime. If this is true, then
disenfranchisement should be consistent with at least one of the current
justifications for punishment: retribution, deterrence, denunciation or
rehabilitation. None of these justifications, however, supports
disenfranchisement of all ex-felons.
¶30 The idea behind retribution is that “a criminal owes a debt to
society. It is fair to require payment of the debt, i.e., punishment equal
or proportional to the debt owed (i.e. the crime committed).” The most important aspect of
retribution is that the penalty must be proportional to the debt.
“Retribution exacts punishment commensurate to the offense.”
¶31 Disenfranchisement violates the principles of retribution.
Many states strip the right to vote from all those convicted of any
felony. This kind of blanket disenfranchisement might make sense if all
felonies were equally serious. The crimes that trigger disenfranchisement,
however, range in severity from murder to “possession of gambling records.” The problem, then, is that the same
penalty applies to all those who commit a “felony,” no matter how serious the
It is possible to adjust disenfranchisement laws in
order to make them consistent with the principles of retribution, rather than
simply eliminating them. To make the punishment fit the crime, legislators
could limit disenfranchisement to those “whose actions were aimed at undermining
the democratic character of the state,” which might include those who commit treason
or election-related crimes. Even with these offenders, though, permanent
disenfranchise would be excessive in some
¶33 According to the theory of deterrence, “punishment is meant to
deter future misconduct.” Disenfranchisement, however, does not
effectively deter convicted felons – or the rest of the community – from future
criminal conduct. First, deterrence depends on the potential criminal
performing a cost-benefit analysis and deciding that the costs of the criminal
act would outweigh their benefits. Deterrents, however, are often
ineffective because “potential offenders do not usually weigh the costs and
benefits of their actions.”
¶34 Even if potential offenders attempt to weigh costs and benefits,
the second problem is that few people know about disenfranchisement
provisions. Therefore, “given its extremely low visibility,
disenfranchisement cannot significantly deter lawbreakers.” The obvious response is that
disenfranchisement might be an effective deterrent if legislatures devised a way
to publicize it, but that argument fails because disenfranchisement is far less
significant than the other forms of punishment that the criminal justice system
¶35 Disenfranchisement is only one of many punishments in store for
those who break the law. Time in prison or jail is, of course, the most
important of these punishments. If the possibility of a prison or jail
term and the accompanying horrors is not enough to deter potential criminals, it
is highly unlikely that the thought of disenfranchisement will be an effective
deterrent. Just imagine that interior monologue:
“I think I’ll go rob that convenience store. I can deal with prison.
Oh wait – I would also lose my right to vote if convicted! Forget
it. I’ll go to a movie instead.” Disenfranchisement, on the other
hand, would be a more effective deterrent in situations where there is no
substantial probability of incarceration.
¶36 Denunciation is an increasingly popular theory of punishment.
It is “probably the most frequently suggested alternative basis of
punishment. According to this view, punishment is justified as a means of
expressing society’s condemnation of a crime.” Denunciation is the theory behind
shaming penalties. According to Professor Dan Kahan, shaming penalties
work by expressing the community’s moral condemnation of a crime, which instills
a sense of shame in the offender and lowers his or her social status. Disenfranchisement could serve as a
shaming penalty because it symbolizes a temporary or permanent exile from the
political community, lowering the status of the disenfranchised person to that
of a political outcast.
¶37 If shaming penalties work by instilling a sense of shame and
lowering the offender’s social status, they can only be effective with those who
care about the loss of social status and have some status to lose. Shaming
through disenfranchisement, therefore, would work best with middle-class
offenders, who tend to be concerned with their relatively precarious social
status. Professor Toni Massaro suggests that shaming
penalties are most likely to be effective for crimes such as “drinking offenses, driving offenses, embezzlement, drug
offenses, spouse abuse, child abuse, and tax fraud,” which “are likely to be
committed by middle-class people.”
¶38 One problem with disenfranchisement as a form of shaming penalty is
that disenfranchisement is a hidden process, and is therefore “unlikely to
impose any public stigma” because members of the community simply do not
know when someone is disenfranchised because of a felony conviction. Only 54.2 percent of the voting-age
population in America, after all, took the time to vote in the 1996 presidential
election. Disenfranchisement, then, is obviously
not the only reason why voting-age Americans do not exercise their right to
¶39 Shaming penalties, however, do not have to be public in order to be
effective. As Professor James Whitman has written, “it
is wrong to think of shame solely as public shame, solely as an emotion
triggered by the gaze of others. Shame, as recent philosophical and
psychological commentators have insisted, can also be triggered by the sound of
an inner voice or the gaze of an inner eye.” Disenfranchisement is a potentially
useful shaming penalty because it might trigger private shame every time
election day comes around and an ex-offender cannot participate in the
Although disenfranchisement might be an effective
shaming penalty for middle-class offenders, the loss of voting rights should
only be temporary, in order to allow the offenders to reintegrate into their
communities. Otherwise there is a risk of transforming offenders into
permanent political exiles, giving them even less reason to care about their
communities, making them more likely to commit criminal acts. Once temporary disenfranchisement ends,
moreover, it would be helpful to have some kind of re-integration ceremony to
restore the offender’s status as a member of the political community.
¶41 Another problem with using disenfranchisement to shame middle-class
offenders is that it will only be an effective deterrent when there is no
significant probability of incarceration. As discussed above, if the
threat of prison does not deter an offender, then the threat of
disenfranchisement certainly will not. Disenfranchisement, therefore, should
only apply to people such as first-time offenders and those who commit
relatively minor offenses. Not only is it less likely that these offenders
will face incarceration, but they might be more susceptible to the symbolic
message of a shaming penalty because it is a warning that they are “flirting with a deep, and deeply undesirable, status
change” from the “respectable” to the “criminal segment” of
¶42 In conclusion, although disenfranchisement might have some
usefulness as a shaming penalty, there are several important conditions for it
to be effective. First, it is probably only effective with middle-class
offenders. Second, it should only be a temporary penalty. Finally,
it is only appropriate where there is no significant probability of
¶43 The final theory of punishment is rehabilitation.
“[A]dvocates of this model prefer to use the correctional system to reform the
wrongdoer rather than to secure compliance through fear or ‘bad taste’ of
punishment.” The basic idea is to give criminals the
tools to become law-abiding members of society.
¶44 Disenfranchisement certainly does not contribute to
rehabilitation. Instead of helping ex-felons reintegrate into the
community, disenfranchisement turns them into political exiles:
"Ultimately, exclusion from the political, economic
and social spheres of life undermines the notion that offenders can ever be
successfully rehabilitated. In conjunction with the exponential increase
in the number and length of incarcerative sentences during the last two decades,
collateral sentencing consequences have contributed to the exiling of
ex-offenders within their country, even after expiration of their maximum
¶44a Disenfranchisement gives ex-felons less reason to care about their
communities, which could interfere with rehabilitation. Giving ex-felons
the right to vote, on the other hand, would have just the opposite effect.
Part III examines rehabilitation and other arguments available to persuade
legislators to give ex-felons the right to vote.
¶45 In conclusion, there is no persuasive reason to prevent felons who
have paid their debt to society from voting. Disenfranchisement is simply
not an effective or appropriate means of criminal punishment. In the words
of the lone Republican in the New Mexico Senate who voted to let ex-felons vote,
“If we want to punish criminals more, put them in jail longer.”
Arguments to Persuade State
Legislators to Give Ex-Felons the Right to Vote
The previous section demonstrates how advocates can
counter any argument in favor of the disenfranchisement of ex-felons. The
next question is what arguments are likely to persuade legislators to give
ex-felons the right to vote.
In the past two years, several states have expanded
the voting rights of ex-felons. These legislative changes sparked lively
debates in the news media of these states, with legislators, commentators and
ordinary citizens expressing their opinions about felon
disenfranchisement. These media accounts provide an excellent indication
of what arguments might have been effective.
The arguments against disenfranchisement fall into two
main categories: racial and non-racial. As discussed in Part I, the
statistics on racial disparities in disenfranchisement are startling.
These disparities alone are probably enough to persuade liberals and people of
color that disenfranchisement laws are fundamentally unfair. It is not
necessary for advocates to use their resources to reach these groups.
Instead, advocates must work to persuade conservative whites.
There is evidence that “[b]eliefs regarding crime and
punishment are highly correlated with…racial attitudes.” Specifically, those who support a
harshly punitive approach to criminal justice issues tend to be hostile toward
any measure that would benefit racial minorities. Race-based arguments against
disenfranchisement, therefore, are not likely to persuade some members of the
target audience, and might even alienate them. The solution, then, is for
advocates to maintain an arsenal of non-racial arguments.
The numbers alone might be enough to persuade a
significant number of moderates and conservatives that disenfranchisement laws
are fundamentally unfair. As Professor David Cole suggests, advocates can reveal the fundamental problem
by asking legislators and citizens to consider the statistics in reverse: Would
they favor disenfranchisement if 13 percent of white men nationwide – and as
many as 31 percent in some states – could not vote because of a felony
Although race-based arguments might be effective in
some situations, advocates still must be able to produce non-racial arguments in
order to reach those who are not sympathetic for whatever reason, whether racial
hostility or merely the belief that a disparate racial impact alone is not a
problem. This section examines the five most
persuasive, non-racial arguments that appeared frequently in the media debates
surrounding changes to state disenfranchisement laws, and suggests ways to
improve these arguments in order to make them resonate on a deeper level with
legislators and their constituents.
It is important to understand the political contexts
in which these arguments appeared. In Connecticut, convicted felons
previously lost the right to vote during incarceration, probation and
parole. In May 2001, the legislature passed a bill that restored the right
to vote upon release from prison. The arguments in Connecticut,
therefore, focused on whether those on probation or parole should have the right
to vote. As for the political dynamics in the legislature, the Senate had
21 Democrats and 15 Republicans. The bill passed 22-14, with three
Republicans joining the majority. In the House, which also had a
Democratic majority, the bill passed 80-63. One newspaper columnist suggested that
one of the reasons the bill passed was because of the support of “a coalition of
more than 40 community, church and civil rights organizations.” This highlights the fact that in all
states – even those with Democratic majorities in the legislature – it is
important for advocates to gather coalitions of sympathetic organizations.
These organizations can shoulder some of the burden of educating legislators and
the public about the impact of disenfranchisement laws, and their involvement
demonstrates to legislators that there is public support for giving ex-felons
the right to vote.
In New Mexico, a felony conviction previously led to
permanent disenfranchisement. In March 2001, the legislature softened the
provision so that felons can now vote once they complete their entire sentences,
including probation or parole. As for the political situation, the
Senate was significantly Democratic; the bill passed 25-17, with only one
Republican voting for it. The House had 42 Democrats and 28
Republicans; the bill passed 39-20.
Finally, in Virginia, the legislature altered the
procedure that ex-felons must follow to regain the right to vote. Virginia
permanently disenfranchises convicted felons. The only way to regain the
right to vote is through a pardon by the governor, which is not available until 5 years after
felons complete their sentences. In 2000, the legislature modified the
process so that, after 5 years, some ex-felons may apply to a circuit court to
restore their right to vote. If the court recommends that the governor
restore the applicant’s right to vote, the governor must decide within 90 days
whether to grant the pardon. The main advantage for ex-felons is the
time limit; in the past, many ex-felons applied to the governor for a pardon and
never received a response.
The change in Virginia is notable because it
demonstrates that Republicans might be willing to extend greater rights to
ex-felons. The legislature that passed the bill had a Republican
majority, and the governor who signed the bill was also
A. Retribution: Ex-Felons Have Already “Paid Their Debt” to
The first argument – and by far the most popular one
in the media debates – is that states should not continue to punish felons after
they have “paid their debt to society.” In academic terms, this argument
expresses the idea of the limiting function of retribution – that is, the
punishment must be not be more severe than the crime.
In New Mexico, both Democrats and Republicans voiced
this argument. Senator Richard Romero stated: “I personally think once you
have done your time, you should have the right to vote.” John Dendahl, chairman of the New
Mexico Republican Party, stated: “Fair is fair. When people have served
their time, all of it, it very hard for me intellectually to say that person
should not be restored to full citizenship.” In Virginia, this argument appeared in
editorials and newspaper opinion pieces. The Rev. Jesse Jackson might have
phrased the argument most effectively: “once
you serve your sentence to society,you
should have your vote restored. If you don't, it's a lifetime
This argument appeals to a basic sense that punishment
is only fair if it is proportional. The argument, therefore, is most
appealing when disenfranchisement seems clearly disproportionate to the crime,
as with first-time offenders and those who committed relatively minor
offenses. Advocates should use examples of real people who committed one
burglary, or possessed drugs for personal use, and now cannot vote. The
less serious the crime, the more disproportionate and unfair disenfranchisement
There is a limit to the effectiveness of this
argument. It is extremely effective against permanent disenfranchisement,
which extends far beyond the termination of criminal punishment in the form of
imprisonment, probation or parole. The argument, however, is not as strong
against disenfranchisement during probation or parole when, arguably, people are
still paying their debt to society. That limitation explains why this
argument appeared only once during the media debate in Connecticut, where the
legislature extended the vote to those on probation and parole.
B. Rehabilitation: Teach Ex-Felons to Make Responsible
The second argument is that giving ex-felons the right
to vote promotes rehabilitation by instilling a sense of responsibility.
This taps into one of the most common arguments in favor of disenfranchisement –
that felons demonstrated a fundamental lack of responsibility when they freely
chose to commit a criminal act. If irresponsibility led to crime, then the
state needs to remedy this problem in order to prevent future crimes. The
state, in other words, must “foster a sense of obligation and responsibility
among” ex-felons. One way to do this is to allow
ex-felons to participate in the electoral process. Giving ex-felons the
right to vote would give them a stake in their communities, a sense of
responsibility to others, and “persons who believe they have a stake in the
welfare of their community are less likely to engage in illegal activities that
will bring harm to individuals.”
In Connecticut, Rep. Kenneth P. Green, the chief
sponsor of the bill that gave ex-felons the right to vote upon release from
prison, took up this argument as his main theme. “I think people who are
trying to re-acclimate to the community can be helped if they’re allowed to have
the civic responsibility of voting,” said Green. In another statement, Green made the
point more explicitly: “When you’re out of jail, we’re trying to re-integrate
and rehabilitate you in the community. Part of that is we want you to make
This argument is likely to resonate with voters
because of the deeply ingrained American belief in individualism, which is the
idea that people freely choose their actions, and therefore must be responsible
for what they have done. In the words of a Republican state
representative in Connecticut, “It’s a choice an individual makes when he walks
into a bank with a gun and decides to rob it.” The rehabilitation argument appeals
to this sense of individualism because it does not try to shift the blame for
criminal activity away from the individual. Instead, it acknowledges that
people are fully responsible for their choices, and simply reasons that giving
ex-felons the right to vote helps them make responsible choices that do not harm
C. Crime Reduction: Voting
means rehabilitation means safer streets
The third argument is that giving ex-felons the right
to vote will help reduce the crime rate by contributing to the rehabilitation of
ex-felons. This argument connects to the previous one, that the right to
vote helps teach ex-felons to make responsible choices. The difference
between the two arguments is that the responsible-choices argument focuses on
ex-felons, while the crime-reduction argument focuses on how enfranchisement
would benefit the entire community.
The key to this argument is to avoid overstating
it. Advocates will lose all credibility if they claim there is a simple
and direct connection between felon enfranchisement and a lower crime
rate. Any conscious opponent will point out how absurd it is to claim that
having the right to vote would instantly reform a felon. Advocates should
instead emphasize that the right to vote contributes to the
process of rehabilitation; it is not a panacea or even likely to be
effective by itself.
This argument has appeared often in the debates
regarding disenfranchisement. A Connecticut representative said she
supported enfranchisement of ex-felons in order to reconnect them to society “so
they do not go back to a life of crime.” A New Mexico civil rights lawyer
argued: “When someone gets out of prison, we want them to be involved enough in
the system and care about the community.” Crime-prevention was also a common
theme in editorials by the Virginian-Pilot: “The more the state does to
help steer ex-convicts into productive, contributing lives, the fewer who will
end up committing crimes and returning to prison.” Or, more bluntly, “Society wins
whenever wrongdoers abandon wrongdoing.”
Crime is an important issue. In 1994, 29 percent
of Americans said that crime was the most important problem facing their
communities. By 2001, that number had dipped to 12
percent, but respondents still viewed crime as the second most important issue
(education was first). The crime-reduction argument appeals
both to citizens and to legislators. Citizens feel safer in their homes
and communities, and legislators get to take credit for a lower crime
Opponents might claim that the best way to reduce
crime is not to expand the rights of ex-felons, but to punish them more
harshly. The response is simple: If the threat of a prison sentence does
not deter a potential criminal, the threat of losing the right to vote will
certainly not be a deterrent. The right to vote is unique in that it has
little value as a deterrent, but significant potential as a rehabilitative
D. Cost: Eliminate Bureaucracy
and Let Taxpayers Keep Their Money
The fourth argument is that giving ex-felons the right
to vote reduces bureaucracy and the cost of government. Giving felons the
right to vote eliminates levels of bureaucracy, which appeals to the
conservative desire for more limited government. Eliminating bureaucracy
also saves tax dollars, an idea that should have nearly universal appeal.
Two Connecticut legislators made this argument in
support of a bill that gave all felons the right to vote upon release from
prison: “The end-of-incarceration standard would be much more rational and
administratively simpler.” The old process in Connecticut
illustrates how disenfranchisement can consume a significant amount of
government resources and tax dollars. The process had three steps.
First, the judicial branch notified the Secretary of State each month of every
felony conviction in Connecticut courts. Second, the Secretary of State
notified voting registrars in each of the state’s 169 municipalities.
Third, felons who completed their sentences had to prove their eligibility in
order to get back on the voter lists. Although the process of
disenfranchisement is not necessarily the same in every state, it will always
require some amount of bureaucracy, and consume some amount of tax
The simplest solution is to allow all convicted felons
to vote, even while incarcerated. Under this system, it is not necessary
for any agency to devote resources to determining whether any particular voter
is ineligible because of a felony conviction. There are, however, two
problems with this approach. The first problem is the expense.
States would have to bear the expense of creating and maintaining a system to
allow inmates to vote. The second problem is politics. Only two
states currently allow inmates to vote, which suggests that allowing inmates to
vote is not politically feasible.
The next best solution is to restore voting rights
automatically once people leave prison. This system is relatively simple
because there is no need for machinery to exclude ex-felons from polling
places. Any person who shows up obviously is not incarcerated, and
therefore is qualified to vote as long as he or she is a qualified voter.
The only difficulty with this system is the need to prevent inmates from voting
with absentee ballots.
Although the cost-saving argument is strong, it cannot
stand on its own. Any smart opponent will point out that the fact that
something costs money is not a reason to abandon it. Maintaining prisons
or the military, for example, is enormously expensive, yet few people would
suggest abolishing them. Advocates, therefore, must connect this argument
with two other ideas. First, disenfranchisement is a waste of taxpayer
money because there is no persuasive reason for it, as Part II
demonstrated. Second, disenfranchisement is wasteful because there are so
many reasons to give felons the right to vote, as this section
E. No Taxation Without
Representation: Ex-Felons Should Have Both the Rights and Responsibilities of
The fifth and final argument is that
disenfranchisement is fundamentally unfair to those ex-felons who become
productive members of the community. It is essentially “taxation without
representation” because those ex-felons who leave prison, learn to make
responsible choices and fulfill their obligations as citizens have no voice in a
fundamental part of the political process.
Advocates should work to locate people who make good
examples. This includes people who have turned their lives around and
fulfilled their responsibilities as citizens, which might include working and
paying taxes, raising children, performing community service, or being involved
in religious or other community activities.
As one Connecticut newspaper columnist wrote, it is
fundamentally unfair when ex-felons “are out on the street, working and paying
taxes, but disqualified from exercising the most basic of civil rights.” In Virginia, Jesse Jackson made the
point explicit when he called permanent disenfranchisement “taxation without
The limit to this argument is that it does not apply
to those currently incarcerated, who do not bear the responsibilities of
citizenship because they cannot contribute to their families or
Important Part of All Arguments: Show, Don't Tell
There is one suggestion that is common to all these
arguments. Journalists and writers have a saying: “Show, don’t
tell.” In political arguments as well as news stories, specific details
have more impact than sweeping abstractions. That means that advocates
must put a face on the issue. Two Virginians on opposite sides of the
disenfranchisement issue offered excellent examples of this approach. A
Republican Senator stated: “I don’t want to go back home to the PTA and say
someone who sold drugs to kids on the schoolyard will now have an opportunity to
participate as a registered voter.” An opponent of disenfranchisement
offered himself as an example. He was a 75-year-old man, a veteran of
World War II, who was convicted of making a false statement to the government
during a business deal. After his release, he was active in Republican
politics despite the fact that he could not vote.
There are two important reasons for advocates to use
personal narratives to support their arguments. First, it is easier for
legislators and their constituents to relate to actual people rather than
abstract principles. Second, because journalists prefer concrete stories
to abstract analysis, advocates who can point to actual people as examples are
more likely to get their arguments into the news. In short, advocates
should show the man who was convicted of a simple drug possession when he was an
irresponsible 18 year old and now cannot vote even though he works, pays taxes,
and attends church every week with his wife and two children. That
concrete example is much more effective than merely arguing to legislators and
their constituents about the unconscionable injustice of
G. The Two Most Important
Political Obstacles to a Campaign to Give Ex-Felons the Right to
There are two political obstacles that might stand in
the way of a campaign to give ex-felons the right to vote: the political
leanings of ex-felons and the notion that members of the public will only
support “tough on crime” policies.
Republicans tend to be concerned that ex-felons will
vote Democratic. The head of the New Mexico Republican Party, for example,
“initially considered opposing” the bill that gave felons the vote once they
complete their sentences. He was “worried that those eligible under the
bill would register with the Democratic Party.” This might be the biggest obstacle
that stands between ex-felons and the right to vote. Advocates cannot
ignore this difficulty, but there are two ways to minimize it.
The first strategy is to focus on the appropriate
audiences. Legislatures with Democratic majorities are more likely to give
the vote to ex-felons, so advocates should focus on these legislatures
first. Once the tide turns and there is a trend among states toward
enfranchisement, advocates can point to that trend in order to strengthen their
arguments to more conservative legislatures. The second strategy is to
focus on the arguments that are most likely to appeal to conservative
legislators. Conservatives – like all politicians – want to reduce the
crime rate. Advocates should also use the rehabilitation and cost
arguments, because individualism and the desire for a smaller government are
important conservative themes. Finally, advocates should try to find
examples of disenfranchised felons who might be more willing to vote Republican,
such as those convicted of white-collar offenses.
¶82 The second political obstacle is the belief among
politicians that voters will only support criminal justice policies that are
“tough on crime,” and will not support policies aimed at rehabilitation.
During the debate in Virginia, for example, one Republican senator expressed
concern that he would infuriate his constituents if he supported a bill that
would expand the rights of convicted felons. Although many politicians seem to
share the belief that the public will only support “tough on crime” policies,
this might not be accurate. According to criminologist Katherine
While there is evidence that public
opinion has shifted in this direction, popular attitudes regarding crime and
punishment have historically been – and continue to be – more complex and
ambiguous than this view allows. The belief that criminals should be
severely punished, for example, coexists with widespread support for policies
aimed at rehabilitation.
¶83 There is hard evidence behind the claim that the public will
support measures aimed at rehabilitation. According to a 1994 survey, 64
percent of Americans believe that rehabilitation is possible for most or some
violent offenders; only 6 percent believe that rehabilitation is not
possible for any violent offender. A Gallup poll taken in 2000 asked
Americans which was the best way to reduce crime: attack the social and economic
problems that lead to crime, or deter crime through more prisons, police and
judges. Sixty-eight percent said they favored spending more to attack the
social and economic root causes of crime. The poll gives the responses to the
same question since 1989. Every year, a majority favored spending more to
attack the root causes of crime.
¶84 Although the Gallup poll does not directly address support for
rehabilitation, the position that crime is a result of “environmental and social
conditions” is “typically associated with support for prevention and
rehabilitation rather than punishment.” Advocates, therefore, should use
these and similar statistics to inform legislators that there is significant
public support for measures aimed at rehabilitation, which means that
legislators would not have to risk losing an election by supporting a measure to
give ex-felons the right to vote.
disenfranchisement laws are embarrassing relics of the past. Because of
these laws, 3.9 million Americans have lost their right to vote, either
permanently or temporarily. More than one-third of the disenfranchised –
1.4 million – are black men. That means that 13 percent of black men in
America cannot vote because of a felony conviction. In some states, up to
31 percent of black men are permanently disenfranchised.
There is no persuasive reason to disenfranchise
felons, particularly those who have completed their sentences.
Disenfranchisement is not necessary to prevent harmful changes to the law or
election-related crimes, or to keep irresponsible people from voting.
Disenfranchisement of all ex-felons, moreover, is not consistent with any theory
of criminal punishment, which means it does nothing to prevent crime and keep
the public safe. There is, therefore, a startling imbalance between the
costs and benefits of disenfranchisement: the cost is unacceptably high in a
democracy, because it prevents 3.9 million Americans from participating in the
political process, and yet disenfranchisement produces no benefit.
Legislators cannot even claim that public opinion requires them to appear tough
on crime and maintain disenfranchisement; there is significant evidence that the
public will support rehabilitative policies.
The disenfranchisement debates that have raged
recently in several states are a valuable resource for advocates because they
reveal non-racial arguments that could persuade state legislators to give
ex-felons the right to vote. First, disenfranchisement runs contrary to
the popular idea that ex-felons have “paid their debt to society.” Second,
the right to vote would help teach ex-felons to make responsible choices.
Third, giving felons the right to vote would help reduce crime, because
communities are safer when wrongdoers give up wrongdoing. Fourth,
disenfranchisement wastes valuable tax dollars because it requires a bureaucracy
to keep ex-felons from voting. Fifth, there should be no “taxation without
representation.” With all these arguments, advocates must avoid abstract
discussions of policy, and instead tell the stories of real people who suffer
because of disenfranchisement laws.
It will be difficult, in this age of punitive
politics, to persuade legislators to give greater rights to ex-felons. But
advocates must persevere. Giving ex-felons the right to vote would help
them turn their lives around, would make communities safer, and is simply the
right thing to do in a democracy.
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Berkeley School
of Law (Boalt Hall), 2003.
 The 14th Amendment generally does not prohibit states from
disenfranchising felons. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
However, the 14th Amendment does prohibit disenfranchisement laws with a
racially discriminatory intent and effect. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S.
222 (1985). It would be difficult to challenge the laws currently in
effect, because they “contain no such direct racial intent.” Civil
Participation and Rehabilitation Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 906 Before the
House Subcomm. on the Const. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th
Cong. (1999) (testimony of Marc Mauer), available at
 See Andrew L. Shapiro, Note, Challenging Criminal
Disenfranchisement Under the Voting Rights Act: A New Strategy, 103 Yale
L.J. 537 (1993).
 See Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal
Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11
Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 153, 159-60 (1999).
 States have the authority to determine voter eligibility
requirements for federal as well as state elections. SeeU.S. Const.
art. I, § 2. cl. 1 (states determine voter qualifications for House elections);
art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (states appoint presidential electors); amend. XVII (states
determine voter qualifications for Senate elections). In 1999, the House
Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on the Constitution considered House Bill
906, which would have given all felons the right to vote in federal elections
after they completed their sentences. Several legal experts who testified
regarding the bill questioned whether Congress had the authority to enact it.
Civil Participation and Rehabilitation Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 906
Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th
Cong. (1999) (testimony of Roger Clegg, Viet Dinh and Todd Gaziano),
available at www.house.gov/judiciary/con1021.htm.
 Many of the arguments for giving ex-felons the right to
vote apply with equal force to people currently in prison or jail. It
would be much more difficult, however, to convince state legislators – and their
constituents – that inmates should be able to vote. This paper, therefore,
focuses on the more politically feasible option: giving the vote to those no
longer incarcerated, including those on probation or parole.
 Note, The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: Citizenship,
Criminality, and “The Purity of the Ballot Box,” 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1300,
 Demleitner, supra note 3, at 160.
The Sentencing Project & Human Rights Watch, Losing the
Vote: The Impact of Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States (1998)
[hereinafter Losing the Vote], available at
 Excerpts from Jan. 17 Democratic Debate, Nando
Times, Jan. 18, 2001, at
 Gore’s statement is painfully ironic. If ex-felons
had been allowed to vote in the 2000 presidential election, and had exercised
that right, Gore probably would have defeated George W. Bush. See infra
text accompanying notes 16-17.
 Maine and Vermont currently allow prisoners to vote.
For a state-by-state breakdown of voting restrictions, see the
 The eight states that permanently disenfranchise convicted
felons are Alabama, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nevada, Virginia and
Wyoming. Two other states – Arizona and Maryland – permanently
disenfranchise those convicted of a second felony. Tennessee permanently
disenfranchises those convicted before July 1, 1986, and those convicted after
that date of first-degree murder, aggravated rape, treason or voter fraud.
Washington permanently disenfranchises those convicted before July 1, 1984.
Finally, Delaware prevents convicted felons from voting until 5 years after they
complete their sentences.
Losing the Vote, supra note 8. Several states
have changed their disenfranchisement laws since the publication of this report
in 1998. Still, this report provides the most recent estimate of the numbers of
 According to the Federal Election Commission, George W.
Bush received 2,912,790 votes in Florida, while Al Gore received
2,912,253. Federal Election Commission, 2000 Official Presidential General
Election Results (2001), available at
The Sentencing Project, Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in
the United States (2001) available at
 The states are Alabama (7.5 percent of the adult
population), Florida (5.9 percent), Mississippi (7.4 percent), Virginia (5.3
percent) and Wyoming (4.1 percent). Losing the Vote, supra note
Lynne M. Casper & Loretta E. Bass, Voting and
Registration in the Election of November 1996 (U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Bureau of
the Census, Economics and Statistics Administration, No. P-20-504,
Losing the Vote, supra note 8.
 The precise rates of permanent disenfranchisement among
black men are: Iowa (26.5 percent), Mississippi (28.6 percent), Virginia (25
percent), and Wyoming (27.7 percent). Losing the Vote, supra note
8. In 1998, 24.1 percent of black men were permanently disenfranchised in
New Mexico. In March 2001, however, the New Mexico legislature gave
ex-felons the right to vote once their sentences are complete.
SeeN.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-13-1(A) (Michie 2001).
Losing the Vote, supra note 8.
 See, e.g., Roger Clegg, Felon Voting, Legal
Times, Sept. 18, 2000, at 70 (“The fact that these statutes disproportionately
disenfranchise men and the young is not cited as a reason for changing them, and
neither does it matter that some racial or ethnic groups at this or that point
in time may be more affected than others.”).
 David Cole, Two Systems of Criminal Justice,
inThe Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique 411 (David Kairys ed., 3d
ed. 1998). However, there is also significant evidence of widespread
racial bias in the criminal justice system. See Comment,
Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement and Its Influence on the Black Vote: The Need for
a Second Look, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1145, 1155 (1994); Ruth Marcus, Racial
Bias Widely Seen in Criminal Justice System: Research Often Supports Black
Perceptions, Wash. Post, May 12, 1992, at A4.
 Cole, supra note 25, at 426.
 Id. at 426-27. Professor Cole deals
specifically with disparate rates of incarceration.
Losing the Vote, supra note 8.
 Dillenburg v. Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222, 1224 (9th Cir. 1972)
(“Courts have been hard pressed to define the state interest served by laws
disenfranchising persons convicted of a crime.”).
 See, e.g., Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73
(N.D. Ga. 1971) (“A State may…legitimately be concerned that persons convicted
of certain types of crimes may have a greater tendency to commit election
 Note, supra note 6, at 1303.
 Marc Mauer, Felon Voting Disenfranchisement: A Growing
Collateral Consequence of Mass Incarceration, 12 Fed. Sent. R. 248, 250
 See, e.g.,Alaska Stat. §§ 15.05.030(a)(2000)
(disenfranchisement for a “felony involving moral turpitude”),
15.60.010(7)(2000) (examples of felonies involving moral turpitude; none relate
to elections or voting). For an example of the argument that many state
statutes are over-inclusive, see Note, supra note 6, at 1303.
 See, e.g.,Miss. Const. art. 12, § 241
(disenfranchising only those convicted of “murder, rape, bribery, theft, arson,
obtaining money or goods under false pretense, perjury, forgery, embezzlement or
bigamy”). For an example of the argument that many state statutes are
under-inclusive, see Note, supra note 6, at 1303.
 At least one state already recognizes the distinction
between those convicted of election-related offenses and those convicted of
unrelated felonies. In Missouri, all convicted felons lose their right to
vote while in prison or on probation. Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 115.133(2),
561.026(1)(1999). Only those convicted of election offenses, however,
permanently lose their right to vote. Mo. Rev. Stat. §
 See, e.g., Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115
(5th Cir. 1978) (stating that, by committing crimes, felons “have raised
questions about their ability to vote responsibly.”).
 Civil Participation and Rehabilitation Act of 1999:
Hearing on H.R. 906 Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (testimony of Todd F. Gaziano).
 Civil Participation and Rehabilitation Act of 1999:
Hearing on H.R. 906 Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (testimony of Roger Clegg).
 Jennifer Peter & Holly A. Heyser, Minority Lawmakers
Unveil Several Reform Bills, The Virginian-Pilot, Feb. 2, 2000, at
 Note, supra note 6, at 1309.
 See infra Part III(B).
 Daniel R. Ortiz, Pursuing a Perfect Politics: The Allure
and Failure of Process Theory, 77 Va. L. Rev. 721, 731 (1991).
 See, e.g., Green v. Bd. of Elections, 380 F.2d 445,
451 (2d Cir. 1967) (“it can scarcely be deemed unreasonable for a state to
decide that perpetrators of serious crimes shall not take part in electing the
legislators who make the laws, the executives who enforce these, the prosecutors
who must try them for further violations, or the judges who are to consider
their cases.”); Nora V. Demleitner, Continuing Payment on One’s Debt to
Society: The German Model of Felon Disenfranchisement as an Alternative, 84
Minn. L. Rev. 753, 772 (2000) (“The claim that ex-offenders vote in an
anti-democratic manner is largely based on the fear that they would elect
pro-offender judges and district attorneys.”)
 Civil Participation and Rehabilitation Act of 1999:
Hearing on H.R. 906 Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (testimony of Todd F. Gaziano).
 John Springer, Encouraging Former Felons to Vote,
The Hartford Courant, Sept. 21, 2000, at B9.
 Mauer, supra note 32.
 Donovan Kabalka, Felons Might Be Able to Vote Again,
Albuquerque Trib., June 29, 2001, at A2.
 Mauer, supra note 32 (suggesting that those
convicted of low-level drug offenses might combine with their neighbors in order
to elect “candidates who support scaling back harsh drug laws”).
 Demleitner, supra note 43, at 772 (“A hallmark of
democracy is that the state is constantly re-inventing itself through the input
 George P. Fletcher, Disenfranchisement as Punishment:
Reflections on the Racial Uses of Infamia, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 1895, 1906
(1999). See also Mauer, supra note 32 (“Is there a policy
rationale that justifies excluding persons who have experienced the impact of
[harsh drug laws] from deliberating about their wisdom?”).
 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965). For an example of this argument,
see Note, supra note 6, at 1309.
 Disenfranchisement of Former Criminal Offenders, 88
Harv. L. Rev. 101, 111 (1974).
Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law § 2.03[C] at
13 (2d ed. 1995).
 Demleitner, supra note 43, at 789.
Alaska Stat. § 15.60.010(7) (2000).
 Note, supra note 6, at 1307 (“permanent expulsion
from the political community is imposed equally on all felons without regard for
the relative severity of their crimes ”).
 Demleitner, supra note 43, at 790.
 Dressler, supra note 53, § 2.03[B] at
 Demleitner, supra note 3, at 161.
 Note, supra note 6, at 1307.
 Demleitner, supra note 3, at 161.
 Dressler, supra note 53, § 2.03[D] at 13.
 Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?,
63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 591, 635-37 (1996).
 Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal
Law, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1880, 1933-35 (1991). See also Kahan,
supra note 63, at 644 (“It is plausible, though, to
think that shaming will be less effective for offenses typically committed by
the poor and disaffected than for offenses more likely to be committed by middle
class or affluent individuals, for whom the cost of stigma is likely to be the
 Massaro, supra note 65, at 1934.
 Demleitner, supra note 43, at 786-87 (emphasis
 Casper & Bass, supra note 20, at 1 (Table
 Theorists disagree as to whether a punishment without an
audience can actually cause “shame.” Compare James Q. Whitman,
What is Wrong with Inflicting Shaming Sactions?, 107 Yale L.J. 1055,
1065-66 (1998) (shame can be a private emotion) with Stephen P. Garvey,
Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 733 (1998) (shame
requires an audience; private penalties actually create guilt). The label
on the emotion is not important here; the result is. Disenfranchisement
creates an unpleasant emotion – perhaps guilt, perhaps shame – that might deter
future criminal activity.
 Whitman, supra note 69, at 1065-66.
 Both opponents and advocates of shaming penalties have
recognized the danger that a permanent loss of status could lead to
recidivism. See Massaro, supra note 65, at 1919; Kahan,
supra note 63, at 644.
 Kahan, supra note 63, at 645 (suggesting
re-integration ceremonies as a way to ameliorate stigma). This would not
have to be a public ceremony, which would be objectionable because of the
expense. Disenfranchisement is a private punishment, so the re-integration
ceremony could also be private – perhaps something as inexpensive and simple as
a formal letter informing the offender that he or she can now vote.
 Demleitner, supra note 3, at 161.
 Whitman, supra note 69, at 1067-68.
 Dressler, supra note 53, § 2.03[B].
 Demleitner, supra note 3, at 153.
 Steve Terrell, Senate OKs Voting for Reformed
Felons, The Santa Fe New Mexican, Mar. 3, 2001, at A7.
Katherine Beckett, Making Crime Pay 84 (1997).
 Campaigns against disenfranchisement should not take for
granted the support of liberals and people of color. Community and
public-policy groups such as the NAACP and ACLU can mobilize support among these
groups in a low-profile manner, without voicing the kind of race-based arguments
in the news media that might alienate conservative whites.
 Cole, supra note 25, at 426.
 E.g., Clegg, supra note 24.
 SeeConn. Gen. Stat. § 9-45 (2001).
 Lisa Chedekel, House Approves Bill Restoring Voting
Rights to Felons, The Hartford Courant, April 12, 2001, at A10.
 Lisa Chedekel, State Felons Move Closer to Voting
Booth, The Hartford Courant, Apr. 26, 2001, at A1.
 Id. (describing “Democratic majorities” in
the legislature) (emphasis added).
 Chedekel, supra note 85.
 Stan Simpson, Out of Jail, But Barred From Voting,
The Hartford Courant, Nov. 13, 2000, at A3.
 See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-13-1.
 Terrell, supra note 77.
 New Mexico Legislature, at legis.state.nm.us (last
visited Dec. 14, 2001).
Va. Const. art. II, § 1 (2000).
Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-231.2 (2000).
 Holly A. Heyser, Assembly Bills Center On Restoring
Felons’ Vote, The Virginian-Pilot, Feb. 7, 2000, at A1 (suggesting that
applications for restoration of civil rights often went into an administrative
 Ruth S. Intress, Voting Measure Revived, The
Richmond Times Dispatch, Mar. 6, 2000, at A8 (describing the “newfound
 The governor might have supported the bill in order to fend
off the criticism of black legislators, who had complained that the governor,
although he claimed to be committed to racial inclusion, had failed to support
any of the bills that were most important to the black legislators.
Id.; Ruth S. Intress, Snubs Alleged By Black Caucus, The Richmond
Times Dispatch, Mar. 3, 2000, at A1.
 Demleitner, supra note 43, at 789.
 S.U. Mahesh, 2 Options Would Let Some Felons Vote,
Albuquerque J., Feb. 2, 2001, at A10.
 Kabalka, supra note 47.
 Editorial, Forward Steps, The Virginian-Pilot, Feb.
17, 2000, at B10.
 Jeff E. Schapiro, Sodomy, Vote Bills Could Be Political
Issues, The Richmond Times Dispatch, Mar. 5, 2000, at F2.
 Jesse Jackson: Recent Laws Mirror Pre-Civil Rights Era
Voting Practices, Corrections Professional, Oct. 6, 2000.
 Editorial, Give Voting Rights to Ex-Felons, The
Hartford Courant, Mar. 24, 2000, at A14.
 Mauer, supra note 32.
 Chedekel, supra note 85.
 Simpson, supra note 88.
 Beckett, supra note 78, at 81.
 Daniela Altimari, House Would Let Convicts Vote
Sooner, The Hartford Courant, April 19, 2000, at A3.
 Julie Ha, Nafis Highlights First-Term Record, The
Hartford Courant, Oct. 25, 2000, at B1.
 Anne Constable, Felonies Have Cost Thousands the Right
to Vote, The Santa Fe New Mexican, Nov. 19, 2000, at A1.
 Editorial, Enfranchisement, The Virginian-Pilot,
July 8, 2000, at B6.
 Editorial, Voting Rights and Felons, The
Virginian-Pilot, Feb. 11, 2000, at B10.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice
Statistics 2000, at 101 (2001) (Table 2.3).
 According to a 2001 Gallup poll, for example, 65 percent of
Americans believe that federal income taxes are too high. The Gallup
Organization, Gallup Poll Topics A-Z: Taxes, at www.gallup.com (last
visited Dec. 9, 2001).
 Miles S. Rapaport & Kenneth Green, Restoring Felons’
Voting Rights: The Right Thing to Do, The Hartford Courant, Jan. 9, 2000, at
 Springer, supra note 45.
 Stan Simpson, Correction Initiatives Worth A Look,
The Hartford Courant, Jan. 17, 2001, at A3. See also Simpson,
supra note 88 (“They can work and pay taxes, but they can’t
 Editorial, supra note 112.
 Heyser, supra note 94.
 Kabalka, supra note 47.
 Heyser, supra note 94.
 Beckett, supra note 78, at 79.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice
Statistics 1994, at 176 (Table 2.45) (1995).
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 11, at 131 (Table
 Beckett, supra note 78, at 79.