|
|
|
|
Volume Seven Masthead
Editors-in-Chief Queena Hu
Executive Articles Editor Jenny Maybee
Submissions Editor Richard Oberto
Web Editor Queena Hu
Jason Balitzer Jeannette Brown Eric Broxmeyer Laura Clark Chorisia Folkman Jason Gist Daniel Harris Maybell Romero Karen Stambaugh Meg Wilkinson
|
POST-WAR IRAQ: PROSECUTING SADDAM
HUSSEIN
by L. Elizabeth Chamblee
Cite as 7 Cal. Crim. Law Rev. 1 Pincite using paragraph numbers, e.g. 7 Cal. Crim. Law Rev. 1, ¶11
¶1“Decades
of lies and intimidation could not make the Iraqi people love their
oppressors or desire their own enslavement.”[1]
-President George W. Bush, May 1, 2003
I.
Introduction
¶2Although
the Bush administration began Operation Iraqi Freedom with the pretext
of searching for weapons of mass destruction,[2]
the operation ultimately liberated a nation that spent decades under a
dictatorial regime. For at least the past twenty to thirty years, the
Iraqi people,[3]
including the Kurds, lived as victims of their own government. Saddam
Hussein and his regime victimized the Iraqi people through torture,
execution, and deportation. As President Bush stated in his address on
May 1, 2003, America is “pursuing and finding leaders of the old regime,
who will be held to account for their crimes.”[4]
After United States troops captured Hussein on December 13, 2003,[5]
President Bush declared, “now the former director of Iraq will face the
justice he denied to millions.”[6]
¶3On January
9, 2004, the United States officially declared Saddam Hussein a prisoner
of war and indicated that it will turn him over to a special court
established by the Iraqi Governing Council under the direction of the
Coalition Provisional Authority.[7]
Yet, prosecution in this forum fails to ensure proof of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt as required by Article 14 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and does not prohibit the death penalty.
Further, such prosecution requires the application of Iraqi criminal law
and procedure where otherwise unarticulated in the governing statute..[8]
This might allow Hussein to twist the laws he implemented to his
advantage. Consequently, this Article focuses on alternative fora for
jurisdiction over Hussein, recommends an ad hoc international criminal
tribunal that does not provide for the death penalty, and examines
Hussein’s liability for genocide against the Kurds and crimes against
humanity.
¶4This
Article will explore and catalogue the international case against
Hussein for injuries inflicted on the Iraqis and the Kurds before the
war began. Although the focus will remain primarily on Saddam Hussein,
much of the rationale also applies to other regime participants. Part II
begins with a historical overview of the Iraqi peoples’ oppression and
focuses on the consequences of Hussein’s decisions and orders. Part III
reviews different jurisdictional options including a national trial by
Iraq, prosecution in the United States, the International Criminal
Court, and an international ad hoc tribunal akin to those established in
Rwanda and Yugoslavia. This Part ultimately recommends that Hussein’s
prosecution take place in an international ad hoc tribunal situated in
Iraq. The Security Council, under its Chapter VII authority, may
establish an ad hoc criminal tribunal to prosecute Hussein for
committing or participating in crimes against humanity and genocide.
Part IV discusses Iraq’s international legal obligations including
treaties and United Nations membership requirements. Part V examines the
legal ramifications of Hussein’s genocide campaign against the Kurds and
applies the relevant elements to Hussein’s actions. It also addresses
the limited arguments that Hussein’s defense counsel could raise. Part
VI applies international principles concerning crimes against humanity
to Saddam Hussein’s most flagrant crimes against the Iraqi citizens.[9]
II. A History of Oppression
¶5Formerly
part of the Ottoman Empire, Iraq obtained its independence from British
occupation in 1932. Several ethnic groups comprise Iraq’s total
population of 24,683,313: Arabs form 75% to 80% of the population; Kurds
comprise 15% to 20% of the population, and Turkomans and Assyrians make
up the remainder of the population.[10]
The Kurds have occupied the northern mountainous regions of Iraq since
the 12th century when the world referred to the region as “Kurdistan.”[11]
Because the Kurds lived in the mountains, separated from the main cities
in Iraq, they developed their own distinct culture and language. Despite
their geographical and cultural separation, the Kurds did not enjoy
political independence. From the 16th to early 20th century, the Ottoman
and Persian Empires ruled the Kurds.[12]
Although the Kurds briefly experienced a year of independence in 1946 by
forming their own republic, the Iraqi regime controlled Kurdish
territory for the vast majority of the 20th century.[13]
Since the 1920s, the Kurds have struggled for independence by staging
various unsuccessful revolts.[14]
These revolts led to Iraqi government attempts to quash the rebellion
and ultimately exterminate the Kurds through the Anfal campaigns.
A. The Anfal
Campaigns
¶6Iraqis
used the name Anfal, or “the spoils,” to refer to a series of staged
military actions against the Kurds of northern Iraq. The Ba’ath Party
formed a complex power structure; full comprehension of Hussein’s
control of the anti-Kurdish campaigns requires a basic grasp of its
components. The highest executive body was the RCC over which Hussein
exercised ultimate power as Chairman.[15]
The RCC controlled a number of regionally based committees including the
Northern Affairs Committee where Hussein served as secretary until
around 1970. He eventually delegated that power to his cousin Ali Hassan
al-Majid.[16]
Prior to Hussein’s rise to dictator, he served as the RCC member in
charge of “Kurdish affairs.”[17]
Before he went into hiding, Saddam Hussein also served as the
commander-in-chief for the armed forces, President of the Republic of
Iraq, and Secretary General of the Ba’ath Party.
¶7In May of
1992 and March of 1993, Human Rights Watch, an international human
rights organization, facilitated the shipment of eighteen tons of
official Iraqi government documents to the United States. The Kurds
uncovered these documents during their 1991 uprising. The prosecutor in
Saddam Hussein’s trial may rely on these documents as evidence of
Hussein’s participation and oversight of the campaign against the Kurds.
Other evidence might consist of eyewitness accounts and forensic
evidence obtained by the Middle East Watch in collaboration with
Physicians for Human Rights. The Kurds recovered the majority of the
following accounts and documents from the offices of Iraq’s internal
intelligence agency, the General Security Directorate (“secret police”).
¶8The plight
of the Kurds at the hands of Hussein’s regime began well before the
first Gulf War. Beginning in 1985, Hussein’s plan to address “Kurdish
affairs” formed a systematic program of destruction for Kurdish villages
through chemical weapons and military force, subsequent relocation of
the Kurds in concentration camps, and summary executions upon arrival.
In 1988, Iraqi forces killed as many as 182,000 Kurds and destroyed at
least 4,000 Kurdish villages.[18]
¶9Until
1988, no government had ever used chemical weapons against its own
people.[19]
Under the Chemical Weapons Convention governments may not use chemical
weapons under any circumstances.[20]
Yet, Hussein’s regime used mustard and nerve gas against at least sixty
villages and the town Halabja. This offensive aimed to terrorize the
Kurdish civilian population, flush villagers from their homes, and
ultimately capture, relocate, and kill them.[21]
The gas attack in Halabja alone killed 5,000 people and prompted
approximately 80,000 people to flee to Iran.[22]
One survivor of a chemical attack on Birjinni stated that he observed,
“‘white, black and then yellow [clouds of smoke], rising about fifty or
sixty yards into the air in a column. Then the column began to break up
and drift. It drifted down into the valley and then passed through the
village. Then we smelled the gas.’”[23]
At first, “‘it smelled of apples and something sweet,’” but then “‘it
became bitter.’”[24]
As a result of the attacks, those exposed to the gases experienced
vomiting, blindness, and painful swellings under their arms.[25]
¶10Once it
finished using chemical and conventional bombing, the army and domestic
militia dynamited and bulldozed Kurdish villages.[26]
The Iraqi army destroyed at least 703 Kurdish villages in 1987 alone.[27]
After the armies razed the village of Serkand Khailani, officials
arrested most of the villagers and later subjected the leaders to
beatings with cables, suspensions from ceiling hooks, and electric
shocks to the earlobes.[28]
Some of those arrested were executed.[29]
Others were sent to the collective camps.[30]
The Iraqi government painstakingly videotaped and documented a number of
these events.[31]
¶11To serve
as a lesson to others, President Hussein approved a special plan for
dealing with Kurds in the Marsh areas.[32]
The plan entailed poisoning, bombing, and burning the homes of friends
and relatives of subversives in the Marsh areas.[33]
It also included an economic blockade to more efficiently “‘limit
provision of their daily living needs’” by diminishing food supplies,
banning fish sales, and banning goods.[34]
To date, no official documents have been found concerning these camps.
However, various agencies recorded testimony of the incarcerated Kurdish
people, and at least one letter from Amn Suleimaniyeh[35]
to the director of security of the Autonomous Region exists.[36]
This letter documents the execution of nineteen people for “being found
in prohibited areas” and forty-seven for being “subversives sentenced to
death by the Revolutionary Court.”[37]
It also notes the deportation of 9,030 people sent to the “Popular Army
camp in the governate of al-Ta’mim.”[38]
¶12Interviews
with survivors revealed the conditions and treatment at the camps. Upon
arrival, guards divided men and women into separate camps and searched
them.[39]
One man, after being beaten with sticks and electric cables, was hung
from a ceiling fan and scorched with hot steel.[40]
Prisoners used cans for bowel movements, ate soup filled with leftover
bones and oil, and often received no food at all.[41]
¶13Convoys
carried the Kurds from the camps out into the country for execution by
firing squad.[42]
At least six people survived.[43]
One of the survivors stated: “[i]n place of the handcuffs, the guards
used a length of string to tie the twenty-eight prisoners in a single
line by their left hands. The men were ordered to stand facing a freshly
dug trench, just long enough to accommodate the twenty-eight bodies as
they fell.”[44]
A gravedigger working in the Kurdish area of Northern Iraq stated, “‘I
must have buried 600 or maybe up to 1,000 people—all killed by the
secret police between 1985 and 1989. Sometimes they were peshmerga,
sometimes women, sometimes children. Sometimes they’d been tortured.’”[45]
¶14A number
of government documents prohibiting human life in designated areas of
the Kurdish countryside confirm the truth behind these statements.
Hussein’s cousin, Ali Hassan al-Majid signed one personal directive,
numbered 28/3650, which stated “[w]ithin their jurisdiction, the armed
forces must kill any human being or animal present within these areas.
They are totally prohibited.”[46]
Hussein also targeted Shi’a Muslims after the March 1991 uprising, where
he publicly stated that the participating Shi’a Muslims should be shot
for treason.[47]
Even before these directives, guards shot around 150 men and boys at al-Mahawil
Garrison.[48]
Guards threw others from the top floor of a hospital, drowned them,
dragged them through the streets, or left them hanging from electricity
poles to terrorize the locals.[49]
In their attempts to retake the cities involved in the 1991 uprising,
loyalist forces used helicopters to attack unarmed civilians, arrested
or shot civilians, and executed young men in the streets and in
hospitals.[50]
¶15In 1998,
the New York Times reported that Hussein executed at least 1,500
people in one year for “political reasons.”[51]
Hussein’s son, Qusay Hussein, ordered the executions as part of a
prison-cleansing campaign. The Husseins then required the family members
of the executed prisoners to pay for the bullets before they could claim
and bury the bodies.[52]
In many ways, the methodical calculation of costs and benefits without
regard for human dignity resembles that of Adolph Hitler in ordering the
extermination of the Jews. Hussein’s method of conducting the Anfal
campaigns by defining the Kurds as the target, concentrating them in one
area, and executing them fits the pattern used by the Nazis.[53]
B. Alternative
“Justice”
1.
A Lack of Judicial Process
¶16Hussein
did not, however, limit his disregard for human life to the Kurds. He
established a court system for all Iraqis that provided few
opportunities for fair hearings and multiple occasions for excessive
punishment. Trials in Iraq were often conducted before “special courts”
and were always conducted in camera.[54]
Hussein employed military officers and civil servants who lacked
judicial training and the autonomy necessary to make impartial
judgments.[55]
The regime sometimes restricted aid from attorneys or
government-appointed lawyers until the actual trial date.[56]
In April of 2001, a “special court” sentenced four people to life in
prison for simply “attempting to form a political grouping.”[57]
¶17The Iraqi
government frequently arrested both the people suspected of
anti-government activities and their families.[58]
Officials arrested a retired medical doctor and his brother-in-law in
March of 2001 simply to pressure his wife, also a doctor, to return to
Iraq.[59]
On July 26, 2002, several of the United Nations Special Rapporteurs
addressed a letter to the Iraqi government requesting information on two
individuals who reportedly engaged in “terrorist acts” inside Iraq.[60]
The letter stated, “it is feared that their confessions [on national
television] may have been extracted under duress and that televised
statements may have an impact upon the fairness of their trial.”
[61] The Rapporteurs
expressed further concern that the men were “at risk of being sentenced
to death and executed.”[62]
They received no response. The Report also stated that no positive
developments occurred in relation to missing persons.[63] 2.
Punishments
¶18On June
5, 1994, Iraq’s highest executive body, the RCC published a series of
decrees in the official Iraqi newspaper, Al-Jumhuriya, which required
amputations and brandings as punishments for at least 30 crimes.[64]
Saddam Hussein signed each of the decrees in his position as Chairman of
the RCC.[65]
In 2000, Hussein and his officials reportedly began using tongue
amputation to punish people who criticized him or his family.[66]
Guards allegedly performed such an amputation on July 17, 2000 in front
of a large crowd.[67]
Hussein’s decrees prescribed the death penalty for car theft,
counterfeiting, smuggling cars or drilling machines, organizing a group
of two or more persons for procurement purposes, falsifying military
service documents, and stealing (when committed by a member of the armed
forces or government employee).[68]
¶19A report
by the United Nations’ Special Rapporteur stated that the government
executed forty-three prisoners on February 3, 2000.[69]
Thirty were reportedly executed for theft, two for drug trafficking, and
eleven for affiliation with the political opposition.[70]
In this same report, the Special Rapporteur stated that he was:
of the opinion that Iraq continues to be
in violation of its obligations under the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, if only because of the sheer numbers of
executions that are taking place and what appear to be extrajudicial
executions on political grounds and in the absence of a due process of
law.[71]
¶20In
December of 2000, the United Nations General Assembly issued a
Resolution strongly condemning Saddam Hussein and his government for
“systematic, widespread and extremely grave violations of human rights
and of international humanitarian law.”[72]
The condemnation extended to suppressions of fundamental freedoms, the
widespread use of the death penalty in violation of the ICCPR
(International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), arbitrary
executions, widespread and systematic torture, and the prescription of
cruel and inhuman punishments.[73]
In his “leadership” capacities, Hussein committed countless human rights
violations.[74]
¶21Numerous
current reports continue to document human rights violations by Saddam
Hussein and Iraqi officials.[75]
Up until “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” the United Nations delegated a
Special Rapporteur to report on the humanitarian situation in Iraq.
Unfortunately, this did little to alleviate the situation.
III. Jurisdictional Options
¶22Before
reaching the merits of the case, one must consider which courts could
validly exercise jurisdiction over Saddam Hussein’s prosecution. Four
primary potential fora exist: (1) Iraqi national courts, (2) United
States federal courts asserting universal jurisdiction, (3) the
International Criminal Court through special appointment by the Security
Council, or (4) an ad hoc tribunal set up by the United Nations Security
Council. The jurisdictional decision will play a major role in
determining both applicable law and procedural constraints.
A. Trial by the
Iraqi Citizens
¶23Since
most of Hussein’s crimes occurred in Iraq and against the Iraqi people,
Iraq retains territorial jurisdiction. The accessibility of physical
evidence, victims, and witnesses makes Iraqi courts seem like a sensible
jurisdiction. A trial in Iraq may promote healing and reconciliation for
victims of the regime. However, heads of state, such as Saddam Hussein,
may avoid rigorous prosecution in their own territories by scare
tactics, force, and an ability to manipulate the law. Additionally, it
could take a considerable amount of time for a viable government capable
of running the national courts to emerge. As evidenced by the number of
insurgencies in Iraq after the capture of Hussein, a number of his
supporters still exist.
¶24Even with
the installation of a new Iraqi government, it could take years for the
government to create a workable court system. Once the new regime
begins, the likelihood of a fair trial by a new government attempting to
purge the old leadership would be slim. Many proposed leaders of the new
government lived in exile under Saddam Hussein’s rule and may view his
trial as a unique opportunity for retaliation. For Hussein to receive
the “justice he denied to millions,”[76]
a neutral judge, or panel of judges, should preside over his trial.
B. National
Prosecution by the United States
¶25Theoretically,
United States courts provide a second option for prosecution. Domestic
courts can invoke universal jurisdiction to prosecute Iraqi officials.[77]
Yet, according to the concept of immunity for acts committed by heads of
state while in office, the United States court might find Hussein
substantively liable but procedurally immune.
¶26Under the
principle of universal jurisdiction,[78]
any state, regardless of its direct involvement in the conflict or
offense, may prosecute “certain offenses recognized by the community of
nations as of universal concern, such as . . . genocide, war crimes, and
perhaps certain acts of terrorism.”[79]
Behind the principle of universal jurisdiction lies the theory that
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes not only violate
international law but also offend the whole of humanity.[80]
Ideally all states would work both collectively and individually to
prosecute violators. Universal jurisdiction invoked by individual states
furthers several important goals: attaining justice for victims,[81]
deterring future human rights abuses through public prosecutions of
senior officials,[82]
demonstrating international concern and collective responses toward
human rights violations,[83]
and protecting the sanctity of ordered society.[84]
¶27A number
of treaties concerning drug-trafficking,[85]
hijacking,[86]
aircraft terrorism,[87]
hostages,[88]
torture,[89]
apartheid,[90]
and attacks on diplomats[91]
expressly include the right to invoke universal jurisdiction. Universal
jurisdiction endows every state with jurisdiction over a limited
category of crimes such as piracy and slave trading.[92]
The list of crimes subject to universal jurisdiction continues to
expand.[93]
As one United States court observed, “nations have begun to extend
jurisdiction to . . . crimes considered in the modern era to be as great
a threat to the well-being of the international community as piracy.”[94]
¶28Despite
an increasing willingness to invoke universal jurisdiction, the United
States must overcome certain procedural hurdles before prosecuting.
United States domestic law includes international law,[95]
and international law recognizes universal jurisdiction for certain
offenses such as piracy, war crimes, and genocide.[96]
However, a person cannot be tried in a United States federal court for
an international crime unless Congress first adopts a statute defining
and punishing the offense.[97]
For the United States to prosecute Hussein three things must occur: (1)
Congress must have enacted statutes to punish genocide and crimes
against humanity, (2) the prosecutor must avoid the obstacle of immunity
for heads of state, and (3) Colin Powell must deflect international
criticism that prosecution represents the victors’ “justice” for the
vanquished.
¶29Congress
banned genocide in 18 U.S.C. § 1091.[98]
This codification simply recognized the accepted practice of using
universal jurisdiction to punish genocide.[99]
Israel first used universal jurisdiction in the Eichmann case to
prosecute Eichmann for executing Hitler’s “final solution” during World
War II.[100]
In its opinion convicting him, the Nuremburg Tribunal stated that some
offenses against the whole of humanity are so grave that “the judicial
and legislative organs of every country [need] to give effect to its
criminal interdictions and to bring the criminals to trial.”[101]
¶30The
United States accepted this principle in approving Israel’s request for
the extradition of Demjanjuk.[102]
The federal district court decided that Israel had jurisdiction to try
Demjanjuk since “[i]nternational law provides that certain offenses may
be punished by any state because the offenders are ‘common enemies of
all mankind and all nations have an equal interest in their apprehension
and punishment.”[103]
As a party to the United Nations, which affirmed the Nuremberg Tribunal
for punishing “persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds”
regardless of whether offenders acted “as individuals or as members of
organizations,” the United States implicitly recognizes genocide as a
crime against all of mankind.[104]
¶31Congress
did not explicitly pass a statute forbidding crimes against humanity,
but some statutes and court opinions indicate Congressional consent.
Acquiescence may be inferred from the Alien Tort Claims Act[105]
and the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991.[106]
The Alien Tort Claims Act provides that “district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States.”[107]
As such, a victim of crimes against humanity could sue on claims of
assault or battery arising from the incident. Federal courts held that
this statute confers subject-matter jurisdiction when an alien sues for
a tort committed in violation United States treaties or international
law.[108]
¶32The
Torture Victim Protection Act reinforces the widely held view that
customary international law forbids torture.[109]
As a party to the United Nations Convention against Torture, which
requires parties to facilitate the punishment of torture through their
municipal law,[110]
the United States has an obligation to bring violators of the Convention
to justice.[111]
Because the Convention adds to customary international law’s prohibition
on torture and requires parties to fulfill their obligations regardless
of the perpetrator’s nationality, the Convention essentially provides
for universal jurisdiction.[112]
Thus, the United States could legitimately exercise jurisdiction to
prosecute genocide and crimes against humanity in federal court.
¶33Impediments
to American prosecution arise in light of conflicting views on immunity
for heads of state such as Saddam Hussein.[113]
Under the concept of state immunity, the offender may be substantively
liable, but procedurally immune before the courts of other countries.
Tensions between the Pinochet case,[114]
authored by the House of Lords in London, and the more recent Yerodia
case,[115]
adjudicated by the International Court of Justice, illustrate two
divergent approaches to state immunity.
¶34In
deciding to extradite Senator Pinochet to Spain for crimes committed
while acting as the head of state in Chile, the House of Lords examined
Pinochet’s alleged immunity based on both the grave nature of the
underlying crime, and on an implied waiver of immunity within the United
Nations Convention against Torture.[116]
Six Law Lords reached the general conclusion that Pinochet’s immunity
dissipated because of torture’s status as a “serious international
crime,” established by either jus cogens or international treaty.[117]
Under this approach, United States courts could adjudicate Hussein’s
acts of genocide and crimes against humanity since those crimes would
also amount to “serious international crimes.”
¶35Lord
Saville employed a theory of implied waiver of immunity based on an
assumption that the United Nations Convention against Torture abrogated
Pinochet’s immunity per se.[118]
Although Iraq has not signed the Convention’s treaty, it did sign the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),[119]
which outlaws a number of crimes against humanity. In addition, Lord
Phillips, in his opinion, decided that because national jurisdiction
over universal crimes was such a new creation, traditional immunities
did not apply.[120]
Accordingly, the United States could attempt to prosecute Hussein under
both of these rationales.
¶36The legal
bar to national jurisdiction arises in the Yerodia case, which
examined the legality of an arrest warrant for Abdulaye Yerodia, the
Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Congo.[121]
The majority in the Yerodia case cast doubt on two major
principles from the Pinochet case: (1) whether a customary
international law norm actually emerged to abrogate immunity for
“serious international crimes”; and (2) whether national courts could
prosecute officials under circumstances similar to those in Pinochet.[122]
In its opinion, the majority refused to waive immunity for incumbent
officers, and stated that it could not “deduce . . . that there exists
under customary international law any form of exception to the rule
according immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability to
incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs, where they are suspected of
having committed war crimes or crimes against humanity.”[123]
¶37When the
International Court of Justice subsequently listed four circumstances
where courts could prosecute high officials internationally, it excluded
the circumstances of the Pinochet prosecution.[124]
Acceptable conditions for abrogating immunity for officials included the
following circumstances: (1) when an official is charged in his or her
own country and tried under the laws of that country, (2) when the
official’s own state waives sovereign immunity, (3) when the official
commits the acts “prior or subsequent to his or her period of office,”
or “during that period of office in a private capacity,” or, finally,
(4) when the official is prosecuted before an international court such
as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”),
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), or the
International Criminal Court(“ICC”).[125]
Since Saddam Hussein committed genocide and crimes against humanity
while acting as head of state and Iraq has not waived immunity, the only
court with jurisdiction under this analysis would be the ICC or an ad
hoc tribunal set up by the Security Council that would resemble the ICTR
and the ICTY.
¶38Although
the Congress enacted legislation enabling United States federal courts
to prosecute genocide and crimes against humanity based on universal
jurisdiction, Hussein’s immunity as head of state bars national
prosecution. American courts could focus on the Pinochet case
rather than the Yerodia case; however, given the public nature of
such a trial, this selective focus might compromise the legitimacy of a
conviction. At the recommendation of the International Court of Justice,
only an ad hoc tribunal set up by the United Nations Security Council,
or the ICC could legitimately abrogate Hussein’s official head of state
immunity for acts committed while in office.
C. The
International Criminal Court
¶39In light
of the Yerodia case, the ICC appears ideal for prosecution of
Saddam Hussein.[126]
However, jurisdictional limitations will foreclose this option unless
the Security Council (1) fulfills its obligation to enforce its own
resolutions through the ICC and (2) applies the enabling statute
retroactively (as was done in the Nuremberg Tribunal). History and
difficult negotiations surrounding the text of the Rome Statute, the
ICC’s enabling statute, indicate that an ex post facto
application of the ICC is unlikely to occur.
¶40On July
17, 1998, 120 countries adopted the text of the Rome Statute, which
entered into force on July 1, 2002.[127]
Article 11 of the statute limits the court’s jurisdiction to crimes
committed after it entered into force and applies only to
states who acquiesce, or “sign-on,” to the statute.[128]
Although Hussein committed human rights violations throughout his
dictatorship, many of his overt acts occurred during the 1980s, before
the statute even existed. Additionally, but not surprisingly, Iraq has
not signed the Rome Statute.[129]
Article 13, however, allows the United Nation’s Security Council, under
its Chapter VII power, to refer crimes to the ICC.[130]
¶41In
reality, the Security Council’s powers remain the same. The Council
implemented tribunals in both Rwanda and Yugoslavia.[131]
Theoretically, Iraq is no different. The difference lies in the forum as
the ICC, rather than as an ad hoc tribunal. In 1991, the Security
Council issued Resolution 688 that stated that it was “[g]ravely
concerned by the repression of the Iraqi civilian population” and
“[d]eeply disturbed by the magnitude of human suffering.”[132]
Consequently, it insisted that Iraq “allow immediate access by
international humanitarian organizations,” and requested the
Secretary-General “pursue his humanitarian efforts in Iraq” and “use
all the resources at his disposal, including those of the
relevant United Nations agencies, to address urgently the critical
needs of the refugees and displaced Iraqi population.”[133]
Although the Council laid the groundwork for intervention, for the ICC
to exercise jurisdiction, the Council would need to not only refer
Saddam Hussein to the ICC for trial, but also undermine the key
principle of non-retroactivity.
¶42Because
many states accepted the Rome Statute because of its non-retroactive
stance, a retroactive application may cause these states to rethink
their acquiescence to the ICC. Sensitive diplomatic issues may also
arise since the United States refused to become a party to the ICC.[134]
The ICC imposes no obligations on non-party states. As it currently
stands, Iraq need not comply with ICC orders, extradite individuals, or
supply evidence.[135]
Tensions between the United States and the United Nations over the war
with Iraq could lead to a jurisdictional fight to prosecute. This would
be particularly unfortunate in light of the necessity for unified
international action.
¶43Even
though the ICC does not provide a viable forum for prosecution, its
principles and law will likely influence those applied to Hussein’s
trial regardless of where it takes place.[136]
The ICC’s Statute of Rome is the most recent and widely accepted
codification of international criminal law. These statutes assume
individual responsibility for crimes against the entire international
community.[137]
In creating the Statute, its multi-national drafters relied on
principles established in the ITCY, ITCR, Genocide Convention, Nuremberg
Charter, and customary international law. As a result, any prosecution
of Hussein should refer to this codification to conduct a trial that the
majority of countries would view as fair and just.
D. Ad Hoc Tribunal
¶44The ad
hoc tribunal provides the fourth and best option for Hussein’s
prosecution. Under its Chapter VII powers, the United Nations Security
Council may establish an ad hoc international criminal tribunal after it
determines a threat to international peace and security.[138]
The Security Council instituted ad hoc tribunals for Yugoslavia (ICTY)[139]
and for Rwanda (ICTR).[140]
The Council fashioned these tribunals after the International Military
Tribunal, which was created by a treaty rather than by the United
Nations. These tribunals survived challenges to the Security Council’s
power to create them under Articles 39 and 40 of the United Nations
Charter.[141]
The tribunals may exert subject-matter jurisdiction over both crimes
against humanity, genocide, and war crimes. To ensure consistency, the
same appellate body hears appeals from both the ICTY and the ICTR.
¶45Tribunals
simply apply existing law. The ICTY Statute requires that it apply only
that “part of conventional international humanitarian law which has
beyond all doubt become part of customary international law . . . .”[142]
If the Security Council creates a tribunal for Iraq, the law would not
apply ex post facto since it already existed as customary law and
would resemble the ICTY and ICTR statutes. A tribunal would also avoid
the problem of retroactivity in the ICC. Accordingly, to avoid
challenges to the legitimacy of the prosecution, the Council should
establish an International Criminal Tribunal for Iraq (ICTI) that
parallels those of the ICTY and the ICTR. The same appellate body
hearing appeals from the ICTY and ICTR could handle appeals for the ICTI.
Although the United States has demonstrated hostility toward ad hoc
tribunals in the past,[143]
diplomatic and legal impediments to prosecution of Hussein in other
courts may encourage United States’ agreement. The ICTI would allow the
victims of the regime to attend and testify in Hussein’s trial since it
would occur in Iraq as well as provide the legal expertise for a trial
of this magnitude. In fact, the Iraqi National Congress proposed and
drafted a statute for this type of United Nations ad hoc tribunal to try
Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Ba’athist leadership.[144]
Since many of Iraq’s new leaders may come from this National Congress,
the new leadership may also request an ad hoc tribunal.
¶46Even
though both the ICTY and the ICTR survived challenges to the Security
Council’s power to create them, Hussein could still attempt a
jurisdictional argument to prevent prosecution. Because the judges
employed by the tribunals also rule on the validity of the tribunal’s
establishment, Hussein could claim that the proceeding was not fair and
impartial. Allowing judges to make appellate decisions concerning their
own employment may be a conflict of interest.[145]
Hussein’s difficulty in asserting this defense would be the lack of any
other court to hear his challenge. Alternatively, conducting the ad hoc
tribunal in Iraq would provide for the close proximity of witnesses,[146]
promote reconciliation by allowing victims to attend the trials, and
would ensure a more impartial trial than would a trial by either the
Iraqi citizens or the new regime. Therefore, the ad hoc tribunal
presents the best forum for jurisdiction.
III. Iraq’s International Obligations
¶47Should
the ICTI survive Hussein’s jurisdictional challenge, it could enforce
Iraq’s treaty commitments as well as its commitments under current
customary international law. Hussein’s commission of genocide and crimes
against humanity violated numerous human rights treaties signed by Iraq.
As of December 9, 2002, Iraq accepted the terms of the following
treaties: the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (CESCR), which Iraq signed on January 25, 1971;[147]
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which
Iraq also signed on January 25, 1971;[148]
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (CERD),
signed on January 14, 1970;[149]
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW), signed on August 13, 1986;[150]
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, signed on June 15, 1994.[151]
As a member of the United Nations, Iraq has an additional “obligation to
promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms” and to abide
by the “obligations [it has] undertaken” by signing human rights
treaties.[152]
Like other states, Iraq must comply with customary law regardless of
treaty ratification status.[153]
¶48The
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law helps clarify obligations under
customary international law. Iraq would violate customary international
law if, as a matter of state policy, it practiced, encouraged or
condoned:
(a) genocide,
(b) slavery or slave trade,
(c) the murder or causing the
disappearance of individuals,
(d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment,
(e) prolonged arbitrary detention,
(f) systematic racial discrimination, or
(g) a consistent pattern of gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights.[154] Sections
(a)-(f) are considered jus cogens, or peremptory norms to which
all countries must adhere.[155]
According to the Vienna Convention on Treaty interpretation, an
international agreement or reservation that attempted to derogate from
those norms would be void.[156]
IV. Genocide Against the Kurds
A. Evolution of
Genocide from Customary International Law
¶49As a
peremptory norm of international law, any act of genocide would be
illegal regardless of Iraq’s international obligations. Raphael Lemkin,
a Polish law professor, first coined the term “genocide” in 1944, and
intended it to signify “a coordinated plan of different actions aiming
at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national
groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves.”[157]
After World War II, the Allies formed the London Agreement, which
included the Nuremberg Charter.[158]
The Allies used this agreement to prosecute the Nazis for crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and crimes against peace. Since the Nuremberg
indictments did not specifically include genocide, prosecutors charged
defendants with “deliberate and systematic genocide” under the larger
heading of crimes against humanity.[159]
The tribunal did not convict any defendants directly or solely on this
charge.[160]
The Nuremberg Tribunals applied charges of crimes against humanity
retroactively since the drafters considered those crimes part of
customary international law.[161]
¶50Allied
Control Council Law No. 10 (Control Council Law) built on Nuremberg’s
first mention of genocide.[162]
Becoming effective in 1945, it provided a broader definition of crimes
against humanity that allowed for prosecutions of genocide under its
opening phrase, “including, but not limited to.” Two American courts,
prosecuting crimes against humanity under their authority as an Allied
occupation zone, applied this Control Council Law and convicted several
defendants of genocide.[163]
These trials of Josef Alstötter, Ulrich
Greifelt, and others led to convictions based on participation “in the
crime of genocide” and involvement in a systematic program of genocide[164]
aimed at “the destruction of foreign nations and ethnic groups.”[165]
These American trials, along with genocide trials in Poland,[166]
propelled and prompted the international community to adopt a
multilateral treaty on genocide that entered into effect in 1951.[167]
¶51This
multilateral treaty, the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention), to which Iraq
acceded on January 20, 1959, defined genocide in Article II as:
Any of the following acts committed with
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or
religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm
to members of the group;[168]
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in
whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent
births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the
group to another group.[169]
To
convict Hussein of genocide he must have “committed” one or more of the
above forbidden acts against members of a protected group with the
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, that group.[170]
Hussein did not have to perform the acts himself. Instead, under Article
III of the Genocide Convention, acts punishable under the treaty include
“genocide; conspiracy to commit genocide; direct and public incitement
to commit genocide; attempt to commit genocide; [and] complicity in
genocide.”[171]
Thus, if Hussein specifically ordered or even turned a blind eye to any
of these acts, his failure to act would constitute genocide under the
Genocide Convention. The International Court of Justice, the ITCY and
ITCR statutes, as well as the International Criminal Court statute all
follow the Convention’s definition and its general elements.
¶52Even if
Iraq had not acceded to the Convention, as a party to the United
Nations, it must uphold certain basic human rights found in the preamble
to the United Nations Charter. The preamble states that members of the
United Nations aim to “reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in
the dignity and worth of the human person.”[172]
Genocide derogates from this general principle by disregarding the value
of human life.
B. Genocide against
The Kurds: The Anfal Campaigns
¶53Rather
than reaffirming human rights, a number of documents and testimonials
show that Hussein, through his own acts and the acts of others,
attempted to annihilate the Kurdish segment of the Iraqi population.
Because Hussein served as the RCC’s member in charge of “Kurdish
affairs,” President of the Republic of Iraq, and Secretary General of
the Ba’th Party, he is liable under the principle of command
responsibility for ordering official acts. He specifically ordered,
directed, and appointed his cousin, Ali Hassan al-Majid, “Chemical Ali,”
to implement a comprehensive campaign against the Kurds which resulted
in: (1) concentration camps, (2) mass summary executions, (3) widespread
use of chemical weapons against the city of Halabja and dozens of
Kurdish villages, and (4) complete destruction of Kurdish villages,
which government documents described as “burned, destroyed, demolished,
and purified.”[173]
In the words of Al-Majid, the Iraqi government took these steps “to
solve the Kurdish problem and slaughter the saboteurs.”[174]
“Saboteurs” refers to the Kurdish guerrillas and civilian sympathizers.
When first ordered by Hussein to quiet the “Kurdish rebellion,” Al-Majid
said “What am I supposed to do with them, these goats? . . . Take good
care of them? No, I will bury them with bulldozers.”[175]
This symbolized the beginning of the Anfal Campaigns.[176]
Although initially believed dead, coalition forces captured Al-Majid, or
“Chemical Ali,” on August 21, 2003.[177]
Consequently, he may also face prosecution in an ad hoc tribunal.
¶54Although
President Hussein vested many of the powers for handling “Kurdish
affairs” to his cousin, he involved himself personally in the
operational aspects of Anfal through his position as president of the
republic.[178]
After “redrawing the map of Iraqi Kurdistan,” which demonstrated his
premeditation to commit genocide, approximately 5,000 to 8,000 Barzani[179]
males “disappeared.”[180]
As President, Saddam Hussein stated, “[t]hey betrayed the country and
they betrayed the covenant . . . we meted out stern punishment to them
and they went to hell.”[181]
Although these acts occurred over the past twenty years, genocide is not
subject to a statute of limitations.[182]
Any act of genocide violates Iraq’s obligations under the ICCPR to
respect and promote the right to life.[183]
¶55To
convict Hussein of genocide, the prosecutor must prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that Hussein killed the Kurds, caused them serious
bodily or mental harm, deliberately inflicted conditions of life
calculated to bring about the their physical destruction, imposed
measures intended to prevent Kurdish births, or forcibly transferred
Kurdish children to another group.[184]
The Kurds must also qualify as a national, ethnical, racial, or
religious group, and the prosecutor must prove that Hussein intended to
destroy them in whole or in part.[185] 1.
Concentration Camps
¶56Hussein’s
design of the Kurdish concentration camps inflicted conditions so severe
that they would meet the Genocide Convention’s requirement that the
perpetrator establish an environment “calculated to bring about [the
group’s] physical destruction in whole or in part.”[186]
In Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR interpreted Article II(c) of the
Genocide Convention as requiring the subjection of “a group of people to
a subsistence diet, systematic expulsion from homes and the reduction of
essential medical services.”[187]
Conditions in Kurdish camps met these requirements, as well as the
Convention’s requirements for “causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group,” under Article II (b). In the Eichmann
case, the District Court of Jerusalem stated that bodily or mental harm
can be caused by “enslavement, starvation, deportation and persecution .
. . and by their detention in ghettos, transit camps and concentration
camps in conditions which were designed to cause their degradation,
deprivation of their rights as human beings, and to suppress them and
cause them inhumane suffering and torture.”[188]
¶57It will
be difficult to prosecute Hussein for this phase of the genocide without
conclusive documentation of his knowledge of the camps.[189]
The tribunal may infer Hussein’s intent, on a case-by-case basis from
the material evidence so long as this evidence establishes a consistent
pattern of conduct.[190]
Although the ad hoc tribunal may impute the requisite knowledge from
Hussein’s numerous official positions, he could argue that he lacked all
knowledge because he designated both power and authority over the camps
to Chemical Ali. 2.
Summary Executions
¶58The
Ba’ath Party itself established the principle of “collective
implication” in the executions.[191]
The Party insisted that its members form part of the firing squads.[192]
For example, when Saddam Hussein assumed his presidency, he forced two
dozen senior Ba’ath officials to confess to charges of treason.[193]
He then ordered the other senior officials to execute them on television
to demonstrate their new loyalty to Hussein.[194]
On June 20, 1987, another document issued by the Northern Bureau Command
with the seal of the RCC (which Hussein chairs) endorsed a policy of
mass murder and incitement to pillage. It directed:
4. The corps commanders shall carry out
random bombardments using artillery, helicopters and aircraft, at all
times of the day or night in order to kill the largest number of persons
present in those prohibited zones, keeping us informed of the results.
5. All persons captured in those villages
shall be detained and interrogated by the security services and those
between the ages of 15 and 70 shall be executed after any useful
information has been obtained from them, of which we should be duly
notified.[195]
Al-Majid
signed the document and forwarded it to numerous branches including the
Chairmen of the Legislative and Executive Councils and Party
Intelligence.[196]
Under the Genocide Convention, summary and targeted executions
constitute intentionally “killing members of the group” because they
meet the ICTR requirement of “homicide with the intent to cause death.”[197]
The prosecution could prove the requisite mens rea and
premeditation by using documents exchanged between Al-Majid and Hussein,
as well as government videotapes of massive executions.[198] 3.
Widespread Use of Chemical Weapons
¶59The Iraqi
regime kept meticulous records and routinely videotaped chemical weapons
attacks on civilians as well as executions and village clearances.[199]
Having cameras ready to videotape the attacks demonstrates
premeditation.[200]
Saddam Hussein murdered about 100,000 Kurds with chemical weapons.[201]
Under Article II (b) of the Genocide Convention, acts of chemical
destruction resulting in death constitute genocide in that they meet the
definitions of “killing members of the group” and “causing serious
bodily and mental harm to members of the group.”[202]
¶60As the
ICTR noted in Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, the tribunal
should interpret the meaning of “serious bodily harm” and “serious
mental harm” on a “case-by-case basis, using a common sense approach.”[203]
According to the ICTR, “causing serious bodily harm” “could be construed
to mean harm that seriously injures the health, causes disfigurement or
causes any serious injury to the external, internal organs or senses.”[204]
Acts of “serious mental harm” likewise includes “acts of bodily or
mental torture, inhumane or degrading treatment, rape, sexual violence,
and persecution.”[205]
The chemicals may have caused a lasting effect on the Kurds; however,
the effects need not prove indelible or permanent for successful
prosecution.[206] 4.
Complete Destruction of Kurdish Villages
¶61Destruction
of Kurdish homes, crops, and livestock by the Iraqi government exhibited
Hussein’s desire to inflict conditions that would bring about the Kurds’
physical destruction. The United Nations Special Rapporteur made
numerous inquiries to Hussein asking for explanations of orders
directing the execution of wounded civilians and the razing of certain
neighborhoods.[207]
He sent no response. A government document titled “Registry of
Eliminated Villages” contained the names and locations of a large number
of eliminated villages.[208]
The ICTR Chamber reasoned that systematically expelling people from
their homes would satisfy the requisite actus reus of Article
II(c) of the Genocide Convention.[209]
C. The Kurds as an Ethnic Group and
Hussein’s Intent to Destroy
¶62For
Hussein’s actions to qualify as genocide against the Kurds, the Kurds
must qualify as a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group.[210]
In addition, Saddam Hussein must have intended to destroy them in whole
or in part.[211]
The Kurds form a distinct ethnic group; they developed their own culture
with a unique Kurdish style of dress and they speak their own language.[212]
They lived in the northern mountainous region of Iraq for thousands of
years—the region was even designated “Kurdistan” in the 12th century.[213]
The ICTR, in Prosecutor v. Akayesu,[214]
stated that the term “ethnic group” is “used to refer to a group whose
members speak the same language and/or have the same culture.”[215]
The Kurds have both their own language and their own distinct culture,
thus they qualify as an ethnic group for the purposes of the Genocide
Convention.
¶63When
Saddam Hussein appointed his cousin, Ali Hassan al-Majid, to extinguish
the Kurds, Hussein exhibited the requisite intent to annihilate this
ethnic group. One observer stated of Al-Majid, “‘[h]e was stupid and
only carrying out Saddam Hussein’s orders.’”[216]
Documented exchanges between Al-Majid and Saddam Hussein make it clear
that Hussein knew and approved of Al-Majid’s work.[217]
Besides a jurisdictional challenge, claiming that Hussein did not act
with the requisite intent may be his best defense to genocide.
Accordingly, he could allege that he simply moved or deported the Kurds
without intending to destroy them. Hussein’s act of designating the
power to Al-Majid works in Hussein’s favor. He may claim that because he
delegated all the power and authority for dealing with the Kurds to Al-Majid,
Al-Majid acted without Hussein’s approval or knowledge. Although the
court could still infer knowledge through command responsibility, the
prosecution may find it more difficult to establish intent through this
theory.
¶64Because
Iraq acceded to the Genocide Convention on January 20, 1959, the crime
of genocide existed in the form of a treaty and as customary
international law during the 1980s when the majority of the above acts
occurred. Accordingly, no significant legal barriers, such as an ex
post facto application of the law, exist for prosecuting Saddam
Hussein for genocide. Plentiful evidence exists to convict him for
conspiracy to commit genocide,[218]
direct and public incitement to commit genocide,[219]
or complicity in genocide.[220]
¶65Despite
the mounting evidence against him, Hussein’s defense attorneys may rely
on a number of mitigating factors. Hussein did attempt to unite the
Kurds and the Iraqi people to create a state with a unique national
identity. To create this state, Hussein spent significant financial
resources to recover artifacts and piece together Iraq’s cultural
history.[221]
He was the first Iraqi leader to visit the Kurdish region.[222]
In fact, not until the United States, Iran, and Israel contributed
resources to promote the Kurdish insurgency in the 1970s did Hussein
begin the Anfal campaigns. Not only did the United States help ignite
the conflict, it removed sanctions from Iraq in 1982 and shared military
intelligence with Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war.[223]
This union culminated in 1984 when, despite Iraq’s use of chemical
weapons on Iranians, the Regan administration sent Donald Rumsfeld to
Iraq to strengthen ties with Saddam Hussein and to offer additional
intelligence and money. When the United States eventually incited
Kurdish rebellion but failed to support it in 1991, Saddam Hussein
squelched the rebellion with a widespread massacre of the Shi’ites.
Consequently, Hussein’s attorneys may try to bring the United States in
as a co-conspirator and deflect attention away from Hussein’s acts and
toward discovering exactly what the United States knew. V.
Crimes against Humanity Committed in Iraq
¶66Saddam
Hussein did not end his struggle to maintain power with Anfal campaigns
or the Kurdish people. As head of the RCC, Hussein personally signed
decrees condoning torture, deportation, unfair trials, amputations, and
branding against his own people. Because many of these actions qualify
as crimes against humanity, the ICTI prosecutor may indicate and
prosecute Hussein for these acts.
A. Evolution of
Crimes against Humanity
¶67Like
genocide, as the name “crimes against humanity” suggests, these crimes
offend the whole of humanity and, consequently, the ICTR and ICTY
considers them international crimes. A Baptist minister first coined the
phrase “crimes against humanity,” in an 1890 letter to the United States
Secretary of State.[224]
However, the 1945 Nuremberg trials first defined and prosecuted
defendants for crimes against humanity.[225]
The Nuremberg Charter substantively removed state immunity for crimes
against humanity, and described these crimes as:
Murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian
population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political,
racial, or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any
crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal whether or not in
violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.[226] Hussein
did not have to personally commit these acts since “[l]eaders,
organizers, instigators, and accomplices, participating in the
formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of
the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any
persons in execution of such plan.”[227]
Approval by the United Nation’s General Assembly to use this definition
to prosecute heads of state chipped away at traditional immunity and
helped solidify the introduction of crimes against humanity into
international law.[228]
¶68Unlike
genocide, definitions for crimes against humanity vary. The Tokyo
Charter in Article 5(c) resembled the Nuremberg Charter, but did not
include persecutions on religious grounds.[229]
Allied Control Council Law No. 10, Article 2, broadened the concept of
crimes against humanity in its definition by including the words “not
limited to” and by specifically adding “imprisonment, torture, [and]
rape.”[230]
Furthermore, the ICTR and ICTY defined crimes against humanity
differently from both former definitions and from one another. A
prosecutor in the ICTY may prosecute “murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, persecutions on
political, racial and religious grounds, and other inhumane acts” only
when committed in armed conflict and directed against a civilian
population.[231]
The ICTR, on the other hand, allows the prosecutor to prosecute when the
accused “committed [acts] as part of a widespread or systematic attack
against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial
or religious grounds.”[232]
Though the ICTY does not specify the need for a “widespread or
systematic attack,” it interpreted the phrase “civilian population” to
include this requirement.[233]
¶69In the
International Criminal Court, relevant portions of Article 7 similarly
define crimes against humanity to include murder, “[d]eportation or
forcible transfer of [a] population,” “[p]ersecution against any
identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national,
ethnic, cultural, religious . . . or other grounds,” “[i]mprisonment or
other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental
rules of international law,” and torture. For any of these acts to
qualify as crimes against humanity the perpetrator must commit them as
“part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian
population” and have knowledge of the attack’s systematic nature. Crimes
against humanity may occur during peacetime or war.[234]
Like the ICTR, the Rome Statute employs the qualification “widespread or
systematic attack” which broadens its jurisdiction and makes these
requirements alternatives. This mirrors the most recent approach taken
by the ICTY in Prosecutor v. Tadić.[235]
The ICTR, while it does not use an either/or approach, defined the term
“widespread” as “massive, frequent, large scale action, carried out
collectively with considerable seriousness and directed against a
multiplicity of victims.”[236]
The court interpreted “systematic” as “thoroughly organized and
following a regular pattern on the basis of a common policy involving
substantial public or private resources.”[237]
B. Basic Elements
Pertinent To All Crimes against Humanity
¶70Regardless
of the precise language used in any one statute, the prosecution must
establish the same five elements under Article 5 of the ICTY, Article 3
of the ICTR, and Article 7 of the ICC to prove Hussein’s guilt. These
elements include: (1) the occurrence of an “attack”; (2) a link or
“nexus” between Saddam Hussein’s action or inaction and the attack; (3)
the attack’s “widespread or systematic” nature; (4) the attack’s target
as a civilian population; and finally, (5) that Hussein’s knowledge of
the attacks fulfills the requisite mens rea.[238]
¶71Hussein
conducted several “attacks” by deporting the Kurds, depriving Iraqi
citizens of fundamental liberties, and by torturing Iraqi citizens.[239]
These instances qualify as attacks because the term concerns the
mistreatment of civilians including the state’s own population.[240]
The ICTY, in Prosecutor v. Nikolic, listed several factors
relevant for determining whether an attack occurred against a civilian
population.[241]
In its list, the court examined “whether summary arrests, detention,
torture and other crimes have been committed,” and “whether massive
transfers of civilians to camps have taken place.”[242]
Similarly, the ICTR, in Prosecutor v. Akayesu, stated, “the act
must be inhumane in nature and character, causing great suffering or
serious injury to body or to mental or to physical health.”[243]
These factors remain particularly relevant in the Iraqi situation
where the government transferred Kurds to camps, summarily arrested
them,[244]
detained them,[245]
and tortured Iraqi civilians.[246]
Each of these actions constitutes an attack; thus, the first element is
satisfied.
¶72The
second element, the nexus between the acts of Hussein and the attacks,
is detailed in each specific act’s section below. However, within each
section two things must be established: (1) the “commission” of the act
(deportation, deprivation, torture) that furthered the attack against
the Iraqi people (including the Kurds), and (2) Saddam Hussein’s
knowledge that these orders/acts constituted part of the greater
“attack.”[247]
A single act, such as issuing a decree, suffices so long as it is part
of the larger attack.[248]
¶73The Iraqi
population satisfies the third requirement that Hussein carry out the
attack on “a civilian population.” As Iraqis living under Hussein’s
regime, they possess the requisite characteristic of a geographically
self-contained group of people.[249]
In some ways, the breadth of the Iraqi population as a target also
satisfies the fourth element of a “widespread or systematic attack.” To
qualify as a widespread or systematic attack, the action “need not be
committed at the same time and place as the attack or share all of the
features of the attack,” however, “it must, by its characteristics,
aims, nature, or consequence objectively form part of the discriminatory
attack.”[250]
Hussein’s actions fulfill both requirements since the Iraqi population
comprises a large number of victims and Hussein,[251]
in his power as president, orchestrated a systematic governmental attack
against them.[252]
¶74Finally,
the prosecutor must establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Saddam
Hussein possessed mens rea that demonstrated he knew about the
attack.[253]
As interpreted by the ICTR, Hussein must have “actual or constructive
knowledge of the broader context of the attack, meaning that [Hussein]
must known that his act(s) is part of a widespread or systematic attack
on a civilian population and pursuant to some kind of policy or plan.”[254]
To establish intent for certain acts, the ICC requires the perpetrator
to either “mean to cause that consequence,” or be “aware that it will
occur in the ordinary course of events.”[255]
“Knowledge” is similar, but for purposes of the Rome Statute, it means
“awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the
ordinary course of events.”[256]
Mental elements requiring that Hussein knew about the widespread or
systematic attack, do not require proof that he knew everything
about the attack, or even that he knew the precise details of plans.[257]
The prosecutor may satisfy these elements by a simple indication that
the Hussein intended to “further such an attack.”[258]
¶75The
prosecutor may have the most difficulty proving the mens rea
element. For the most part, crimes against humanity are not strict
liability crimes. Article 28 of the ICC provides guidance by discussing
a form of constructive knowledge for trying “superiors” such as Saddam
Hussein. Hussein could be held criminally responsible for crimes against
humanity committed by his subordinates. These subordinates would include
the Iraqi military or any type of Iraqi security force. Hence, Hussein
may be liable for failing to “exercise control properly over such
subordinates” in three situations: (1) where Hussein either knew, or
“consciously disregarded” information, such as United Nations or Human
Rights reports indicating that his subordinates were either committing
or about to commit such crimes; (2) where the crimes “concerned
activities that were within [his] effective responsibility and control”;
or (3) where Hussein failed to take all “necessary and reasonable
measures” within his power to stop the acts from being committed, or
alternatively, failed to “submit the matter to the competent authorities
for investigation and prosecution.”[259]
The ICC’s position, requiring that a superior knew or should have known,
differs from an earlier position taken by the United States Supreme
Court which applied a standard just short of strict liability to a
Japanese Commanding General.[260]
C. Saddam Hussein’s
Crimes against Humanity
1.
Deportation or Forcible Transfer of the Kurdish Population
¶76The
prosecutor may address the majority of Saddam Hussein’s actions against
the Kurds under the Genocide Convention. However, the Convention does
not address deportation, which constitutes a distinct crime against
humanity. The United Nations General Assembly expressed concern over the
“forced displacement of hundreds of thousands
of Iraqi civilians,” “the destruction of Iraqi towns and villages,” and
“the fact that tens of thousands of displaced Kurds have had to take
refuge in camps and shelters in the north of Iraq.”[261]
¶77Customary
international law recognizes deportation as a crime against humanity, as
does Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter, Article 5(d) of the ICTY,
Article 3(d) of the ICTR, and in Allied Control Council Law No. 10. In
addition, the ICCPR states, “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the
right to enter his own country.”[262]
To convict Hussein of deporting the Kurdish population, he must have
used expulsion or other types of coercion to forcibly transfer or deport
one or more persons into another State or place.[263]
“Population,” as interpreted by the ICTY in the Tadic case,
“impl[ies] crimes of a collective nature and thus exclude single or
isolated acts which . . . do not rise to the level of crimes against
humanity.”[264]
The Iraqi regime’s displacement of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi
civilians qualifies as more than a single or isolated act. “Forcibly”
does not denote only physical force, but may also encompass threats or
types of coercion caused by creating a coercive environment or by using
“fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse
of power.”[265]
Hussein appears to have forcibly deported the Kurds. He issued an order
concerning Kurdish villages that stated, “within their jurisdiction, the
armed forces must kill any human being or animal present within these
areas. They are totally prohibited.”[266]
¶78In
addition to a forcible deportation, the displaced persons must have been
“lawfully present” in the area prior to being moved.[267]
“Lawful” probably refers first to national law, but where a national law
severely contradicts an international law, as in the Iraqi situation,
then “lawful” should refer to an international principle.[268]
Otherwise, dictators such as Hussein could circumvent this element by
enforcing self-interested laws like Iraqi directive 28/3650 that
prohibited human life in over 1,000 Kurdish villages.[269]
Prior to this directive, the Kurds lawfully inhabited these areas for
more than a thousand years.[270]
Strictly interpreting “lawful” as national law where it would allow
dictators to legislate their way out of criminal conduct contradicts
principles in the Nuremburg Charter.[271]
¶79As
commander-in-chief of Iraq’s armed forces and as Chairman of the RCC,
Hussein condoned the deportation of over 400,000 Iraqi citizens
(including Kurds) holding valid Iraqi passports.[272]
Hussein’s personal responsibility for the purges began with his
accession to power in which he deported or executed several Shi’ite
clerics.[273]
Evidence exists to support Hussein’s knowledge, both actual and
constructive, of the forced deportation of non-Arabs in Hussein’s
Arabization campaign. United Nations Special Rapporteur Max van der
Stoel submitted numerous reports to the United Nations that detailed
instances of forced relocations and wrote various letters to Hussein and
the Iraqi government requesting evidence of cessation.[274]
If nothing else, these letters put Hussein on notice of violations by
subordinates. Hence, his defense would have difficulty establishing his
ignorance. The discovery phase of any prosecution may uncover additional
documents actually signed by Hussein. 2.
Arbitrary and Severe Deprivation of Physical Liberty
¶80The
list of crimes against humanity does not end with Kurdish deportation.
Hussein also imprisoned Iraqi citizens and deprived them of their
physical liberty through arbitrary arrests, detentions, unfair trials,
long prison sentences, branding, amputation, and excessive use of the
death penalty. The ICTR, the ICTY, and the Allied Control Council Law
No. 10 prohibit excessive and unjust imprisonment in their instruments.
Previous statutes include the term “other severe deprivation of physical
liberty.” This phrase has emerged as a “catch all” provision for
borderline types of confinement that may not fit within other
definitions but nonetheless rises to the level of a crime against
humanity. Article 9 of the ICCPR requires government to ensure certain
due process rights including prohibition against arbitrary arrests or
detentions, prompt information concerning charges, timely trials, and
court proceedings within a reasonable time.[275]
Similarly, Article 14 of the ICCPR entitles everyone to a “fair and
public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal
established by law.”[276]
¶81The Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court and the ICTY require the
prosecutor to establish three general elements before convicting Hussein
for unlawfully imprisoning or severe depriving Iraqis of physical
liberty.[277]
First, the prosecutor must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
Hussein imprisoned or otherwise deprived one or more persons of their
physical liberty.[278]
Second, the prosecutor must establish that Hussein’s conduct was severe
enough to breach the fundamental rules of international law by
arbitrarily depriving the Kurds of their liberty.[279]
“Fundamental” refers to the nature of the violation, not whether the
accused complied with every procedure available in international law.[280]
“Arbitrarily” means that no legal basis can be invoked to justify the
deprivation of liberty and that the individual did not benefit from the
due process of law.[281]
Third, the prosecutor must prove that Hussein knew about the
imprisonments and deprivations and was aware of their severity.[282]
The ICTY interpreted this third element to mean “the accused, or a
person or persons for whom the accused bears criminal responsibility
[performed the act] with the intent to deprive the individual
arbitrarily of his or her physical liberty or in the reasonable
knowledge that is act or omission is likely to cause arbitrary
deprivation of physical liberty.”[283]
¶82Despite
signing the ICCPR,[284]
in which Iraq purports to guarantee its citizens “a fair and public
hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established
by law,”[285]
Hussein deprived a number of Iraqi citizens of their due process rights
in several ways. Little or no due process exists in Iraqi courts.[286]
The government conducts trials in camera, before “special
courts,”[287]
allows military officers and even civil servants (all of whom lack
judicial training and the necessary autonomy for impartial judgments) to
preside over trials,[288]
and often limits legal aid to the actual trial date.[289]
¶83The
prosecutor should be able to establish Hussein’s knowledge of the
deprivations of due process and resulting imprisonments. The families of
victims and officials from the United Nations sent letters directly to
Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Government.[290]
These letters, combined with visits by the United Nations Special
Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights provide evidence of
Hussein’s knowledge. The Rapporteur may have based his visit to Iraq, in
part, on allegations of the lack of fair trials and the suppression of
freedom of expression and association.[291]
His report stated that the Government of Iraq continued to disregard its
obligations under Articles 9 and 14 of the ICCPR.[292]
These articles prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention as well as
entitle citizens to a fair and pubic hearing by a competent, independent
and impartial tribunal.[293]
The report expressed concern about long detentions without charges, the
lack of access to lawyers, non-public trials, death sentences in
absentia, and the lack of an appellate body to review decisions.[294]
3.
“Other Inhumane Acts”: Excessive Punishments & Excessive Use of the
Death Penalty
¶84The ICTR
and ICTY prohibit acts that are inhumane in nature and character that
are not specifically included in their particular instruments, but are
“of comparable seriousness” and “comparable gravity” to the enumerated
acts.[295]
As the ICTR noted in Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana,
“[t]hese will be acts or omissions that deliberately cause serious
mental or physical suffering or injury or constitute a serious attack on
human dignity.[296]
The Prosecution must prove a nexus between the inhumane act and the
great suffering or serious injury to mental or physical health of the
victim.”[297]
The ICTI should determine whether an act constitutes an inhumane act “on
a case-by-case basis.”[298]
In the ICTR, the inhumane act or omission must “(a) [b]e directed
against member(s) of the civilian population; (b) [t]he perpetrator must
have discriminated against the victim(s), on one or more of the
enumerated discriminatory grounds; (c) [t]he perpetrator’s act or
omission must form a part of a widespread or systematic attack and the
perpetrator must have knowledge of this attack.”[299]
In Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, the ICTR acknowledged,
“a third party could suffer serious mental harm by witnessing acts
committed against other, particularly against family or friends.”[300]
The ICTR held that the defendant act of decapitation, castration, and
piercing a skull with a spike constituted “other inhumane acts” in
Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka.[301]
¶85The
ICTY’s interpretation of “other inhumane acts” varies slightly from that
of the ICTR. The tribunal in Prosecutor v. Vasilijevic required
that the prosecutor establish the following elements for “other inhumane
acts:”
(i) the occurrence of an act or omission
of similar seriousness to the other enumerated acts under the Article;
(ii) the act or omission caused serious mental or physical suffering or
injury or constituted a serious attack on human dignity; and (iii) the
act or omission was performed deliberately by the accused or a person or
persons for whose acts and omissions he bears criminal responsibility.[302]
To
assess the seriousness of an act, the tribunal should consider the
factual circumstances, the context in which the act or omission
occurred, the personal circumstances of the victim including his or her
age, sex, and health, as well as the physical, mental, and moral effects
on the victim.[303]
The tribunal may also consider the long-term effects of the act or
omission on the victim.[304]
¶86Hussein
signed a number of decrees mandating branding and amputations as
punishments for Iraqi citizens.[305]
The tribunal may need to consider each branding or amputation on a
case-by-case basis, but may also take Iraq’s other international
obligations into consideration when determining whether these acts
constitute an inhumane act. Article 7 of the ICCPR, a “fundamental” rule
of law to which Iraq is a party, states, “[n]o one shall be subjected to
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”[306]
Although the general comments to the ICCPR do not explicitly list the
treatments considered degrading, the comments forbid acts that cause
either mental or physical suffering. Branding and amputations would most
likely qualify as “excessive chastisement ordered as a punishment for a
crime or as an educative or disciplinary measure.”[307]
The ICCPR permits no derogation from Article 7. Hussein, as the primary
sponsor and promulgator this punishment seems to have violated this
treaty. Because Hussein signed the decrees, the prosecutor should have
little difficulty establishing Hussein’s knowledge of the decrees and
their potential effects on Iraqi citizens. Consequently, the ICTI may
convict him of “other inhumane acts.”
¶87Saddam
Hussein also signed an order instituting the death penalty for all
deserters and draft evaders and gave it retroactive application.[308]
This retroactive application even contravenes the Iraqi Penal Code,
which states in Article 1, “[n]o act or omission shall be penalized
except in accordance with a legislative provision under which the said
act or omission is regarded as a criminal offense at the time of its
occurrence.”[309]
Article 6(2) of the ICCPR also forbids excessive use of the death
penalty, and states “[i]n countries which have not abolished the death
penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious
crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission
of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present
Covenant.”[310]
¶88These
decrees promoting widespread use of the death penalty not only conflict
with fundamental rules of international law, but also violate Hussein’s
agreement under the ICCPR. The deprivation of life for minor offenses
such as theft, drug trafficking, and affiliation with political
opposition, breach Article 6 of the ICCPR. Hussein’s signatures on the
documents show that he not only consented to the decrees, but also
ordered them himself. The Special Rapporteur’s reports and requests for
additional information alerted Hussein to the severity of the situation,
yet Hussein refused to provide additional information and actually
issued more decrees. Although Hussein’s actions breached Iraq’s
treaties, for the ICTI to hold Hussein personally liable, these breaches
must constitute “other inhumane acts.” Like the analysis for branding
and amputations, the ICTI would need to examine the circumstances for
each instance in which Hussein’s officials actually carried out the
death penalty for minor violations on a case-by-case basis. The families
of the victims will most likely be able to fill in these details, and
additional evidence may emerge during the trial. 4.
Torture
¶89The ICTY,[311]
ICTR,[312]
and Allied Control Council Law No. 10 all expressly list torture as a
crime against humanity.[313]
Interestingly, neither the Nuremberg nor the Tokyo Charters specified
torture as a crime against humanity, however, it would still have
qualified as an “inhumane act.” Article 7(2)(e) of the Rome Statute
defines “torture” as “the intentional infliction of severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a person in custody or under
the control of the accused; except that torture shall not include pain
or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful
sanctions.”[314]
Furthermore, under the ICC, torture need not be carried out for a
particular purpose to constitute a crime against humanity.[315]
The absence of a need for a particular purpose differs from requirements
in the Torture Convention.[316]
Since Iraq is not a party to the Torture Convention, those principles
would not strictly apply. However, Iraq is a party to the ICCPR which
states in Article 7, “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”[317]
The general comments to the ICCPR allow no derogations or justifications
from this article, which seems to make government parties strictly
liable.[318]
¶90To
convict Saddam Hussein of torture in a tribunal with a statute similar
to the Rome Statute, ICTY, or ICTR the prosecutor must meet several
elements. First, Hussein or his guards must have inflicted severe mental
or physical suffering on a person or persons in Hussein’s control or
custody.[319]
Second, Hussein or his officials must have intended to inflict, by act
or omission the mental or physical pain.[320]
Finally, Hussein or his officials must have aimed their actions or
omissions “at obtaining information or a confession, or at punishing,
intimidating or coercing the victim or a third person, or at
discriminating on any ground, against the victim or a third person.”[321]
Torture cannot have occurred only as a result of “lawful sanctions.” No
indication exists as to whether “lawful” refers to national or
international law. However, in order for this element to make any sense
when applied to a state actor such as Saddam Hussein, it must indicate
international law.
¶91The
ICCPR’s 1992 general comments to Article 7 make clear Saddam Hussein’s
duty to the Iraqi people. They state in part, “[i]t is the duty of the
State party to afford everyone protection through legislative and other
measures as may be necessary against the acts prohibited in article 7,
whether inflicted by people acting in their official capacity, outside
their official capacity or in a private capacity.”[322]
“The text of article 7 allows of no limitation.”[323]
No justifications or extenuating circumstances may be used as an excuse
for any reason. In this regard, the Committee noted that “it is not
sufficient for the implementation of article 7 to prohibit such
treatment or to make it a crime.”[324]
The prohibition extends to acts that cause both physical and mental
suffering.[325]
It also extends to prolonged solitary confinement.[326]
Amnesties for committing torture do not comport with the duties in the
ICCPR, and contradict the duty of the States to investigate all such
acts.[327]
¶92By
knowingly promoting and tolerating torture in Iraq, Hussein violated his
duty under the ICCPR, and the prosecutor could convict him under the
ICTY or ICTR statutes. In his official capacity, prisoners are
effectively under his control, and, under the ICCPR, no sanctions
allowing torture may be “lawful.” Thus, the ICTI may convict Hussein of
torturing prisoners in an ad hoc tribunal. Iraq may also face sanctions
in a proceeding, possibly in the International Court of Justice, that
strictly determines Iraq’s compliance with the ICCPR treaty.
IV. Conclusion
¶93For all
of the Iraqi citizens to begin a peaceful new government, they should be
allowed to participate in justice system that permits them to voice
their collective experiences before a knowledgeable judge. An ad hoc
tribunal, instituted by the United Nations Security Council’s Chapter
VII power, provides the best option for prosecuting Saddam Hussein and
for promoting reconciliation. Ensuring that Hussein receives a fair
trial will set valuable legal precedent for both the international and
the Iraqi community. Justice brought about by the ICTI should play an
integral role in rebuilding Iraqi sovereignty and in promoting a solid
state of democracy after years of internal turmoil.
[1] President George
W. Bush, Address to the Nation (May 1, 2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/iraq/20030501-15.html
(last visited April 7, 2004).
[2] The Bush
administration has yet to find any weapons of mass destruction.
The Gospel According to George,
Newsweek,
Mar. 26, 2004, at 18. Nevertheless, a number of views emerged
about Bush’s policy even before that admission. See Ivan
Eland, Symposium, What Should the United States Do About Saddam
Hussein?, 50 Emory L.J.
833, 853 (2001) (“Despite the conduct of a wise, restrained
military policy during the first 165 years of the nation's history,
the aberration of more than fifty years of Cold War and post-Cold
War U.S. interventionism now seems like the norm and has led U.S.
presidents to become arrogant in their exercise of U.S. military
power overseas. George W. Bush has promised the American public a
more "humble" foreign policy. Let it begin with U.S. policy toward
Iraq.”); Norman G.
Printer, Jr., Deterring Saddam Hussein: Between Iraq and a Hard
Place, 30 S.U. L. Rev. 85, 97 (2003) (The
current Bush Administration urged the Council to adopt smart
sanctions that would have reduced the number of dual-use items and
expanded the number of humanitarian items, while offering incentives
and disincentives to Iraq's neighbors aimed at stifling smuggling.”).
[3] An initial, but imperative distinction exists between
“Iraq” as the Arab Ba’ath Socialist Party led by Saddam Hussein and
“Iraq” as the Iraqi people. The Security Council’s use of “Iraq” in
Resolutions 1441 and 688 targeted only Saddam Hussein and his
regime. In 2002, the United Nations Security Council issued
Resolution 1441 which stipulated that Iraq “has been and remains in
material breach of its obligations,” but extended it a “final
opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations.” S.C. Res.
1441, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4644th mtg. at 3, 5, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1441
(2002). The Security Council referenced Resolution 688, S.C. Res.
688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/688v (1991),
which demanded Iraq “immediately end” the “repression of the Iraqi
civilian population, and allow organizations providing humanitarian
relief to aid those needing help.” Id. In closing, the
Resolution warned Iraq that it would “face serious consequences” if
it continued to violate its obligations. Id. For more
information on the use of force under the authority of the United
Nations Security Council, see Patrick McLain, Note, Settling the
Score with Saddam: Resolution 1441 and Parallel Justifications for
the Use of Force Against Iraq, 13
Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 233,
241 (2003); Printer, supra note 2
.
[4] President George
W. Bush, Address to the Nation (May 1, 2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/iraq/20030501-15.html
(last visited April 7, 2004).
[5] Prior to his
capture, a number of scholars debated the merits of forcible
abduction. See Louis R. Beres, Why and How Saddam Must be
Punished: A Jurisprudential/Philosophic Explanation,
78 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 667
(1998).
[6] President George
W. Bush, Address to the Nation on the Capture of Saddam Hussein
(Dec. 14, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031214-3.html
(last visited Jan. 19, 2004).
[7] Saddam Hussein
as a P.O.W.: Q & A on the Prisoner-of-War Status of Saddam Hussein,
Human Rights News, Jan. 22, 2004, available at http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/01/27/iraq7076.htm#5
(last visited Feb. 15, 2004).
[8] Id.
[9] Although evidence
of war crimes also exists, any discussion of past or future war
crimes is beyond the scope of this Article. Adjudication of these
war crimes would require separate consideration of jurisdictional
issues to address Iraq’s counter-allegations against the United
States. For more information about past war crimes committed by
Iraq, see James S. Robbins, War Crimes: The Case of Iraq, 18
Fletcher F. World Aff. 45
(1994); Kenneth A. Williams, The Iraq-Kuwait
Crisis: An Analysis of the Unresolved Issue of War Crimes Liability,
18 Brook. J. Int’l L. 385
(1992).
[10]
Central Intelligence Agency,
The World Factbook (2003), available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/
(last visited Feb. 21, 2004). These groups speak Arabic, Kurdish,
Assyrian, and Armenian.
[11]
Middle East
Watch, Genocide In Iraq 23 (1993)
(citing P. J. Braidwood,
Prehistoric Investigation In Iraqi Kurdistan (1960)).
[12] Id. at 24.
[13] Id. at
24-26.
[14] Id. at 24.
The Kurds have also fought against one another because of
ideological and personal dissension. Although they united briefly
after the first Gulf War, division and conflict quickly reappeared.
Gavin A. Symes, Note, Force Without Law: Seeking A Legal
Justification for the September 1996 U.S. Military Intervention in
Iraq, 19 Mich. J. Int’l
L. 581, 585 (1998).
[15]
Human Rights Watch, Genocide
in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds 76 n.37 (1993).
The RCC forcibly returned to power in 1968. The chairman of the RCC
was the “president of the republic . . . . the supreme organ of the
state, charged with the mission of carrying out the popular will by
removing from power the reactionary, the dictatorial, and the
corrupt elements of society and by returning power to the people.”
Catherine S. Knowles, Life and Human Dignity, the
Birthright of All Human Beings: An Analysis of the Iraqi Genocide of
the Kurds and Effective Enforcement of Human Rights, 45
Naval L. Rev. 152,
152, 155-56 (1998) (citing
Middle East
Watch, supra
note 11 , at 25).
[16]
Human Rights Watch,
supra note 15 , at 76 n.37.
[17] Id. at 33.
[18]
Staff of Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 102d Cong., 1st Sess, Staff Report on Kurdistan
in the Time of Saddam Hussein 56 (Comm. Print 1991)
(primarily authored by Peter W. Galbraith); see also
Gerard Chaliand, The Kurdish
Tragedy 3 (1994).
[19]
Human Rights Watch,
supra note 15 , at 61.
[20] Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and Their Destruction, opened for signature Jan.
13, 1993, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 27, U.N. Doc. A/47/27,
App. I (1992), reprinted in
Shadow and Substance: The
Chemical Weapons Convention 307 (Benoit Morel & Kyle Olson
eds., 1993).
[21] The Human Rights
Watch has cataloged the forty known attacks.
Human Rights Watch,
supra note 15 , at 360-63.
[22] International
Federation for Human Rights, Report on Iraq: Continuous and
Silent Ethnic Cleansing, Displaced Persons in Iraqi Kurdistan and
Iraqi Refugees in Iran, at 7 (January, 2003), available at
http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/iq350a.pdf (last visited April 7,
2004).
[23]
Human Rights Watch,
supra note 15 , at 270.
[24]Id.; see
also Human Rights Watch,
Endless Torment: The 1991 Uprising in Iraq and Its Aftermath,
at n.8 (1992),
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/Iraq926.htm (last
visited, Feb. 22, 2004).
[25]
Human Rights Watch,
supra note 15 , at 62.
[26] Id. at
107.
[27] Id. at 73.
[28] Id. at
325.
[29] Id.
[30] International
Federation for Human Rights, supra note 22 , at 6.
[31] See,
e.g., U.N. Special Rapporteur’s Report, E/CN.4/1993/45 (Feb. 19,
1993). This report contains a document marked confidential and
personal that gives instructions for carrying out the demolition of
villages.
[32]
Iraqi National Congress,
Crimes Against Humanity and the Transition from Dictatorship to
Democracy 146 (1993);
Human Rights Watch, Endless Torment: The 1991 Uprising in Iraq and
Its Aftermath (1992), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/Iraq926.htm
(last visited Feb. 22, 2004).
[33]
Iraqi National Congress,
supra note 32 , at 146.
[34]Id.
[35] Iraqi
headquarters in the city of Suleimaniyeh.
[36]
Human Rights Watch/Middle
East, supra note, at 141-42.
[37] Id.
[38] Id.
[39]
Human Rights Watch,
supra note 15 , at 213, available at
http://hrw.org/reports/1993/iraqanfal/ANFAL8.htm (last visited
February 17, 2004).
[40]
Human Rights Watch/Middle
East, supra note, at 145-47.
[41] Id. at
144.
[42]
Human Rights Watch/Middle
East, supra note, at 160-61.
[43] Id.
[44] Id. at
161.
[45]
Iraqi National Congress,
supra note 32 , at 30. Peshmerga are “those who face
death,” namely Kurdish fighters.
Human Rights Watch, supra note 15 , at 370.
[46] Id. at
79-80.
[47] Amnesty
International, Human Rights Committee Briefing, AI Index MDE
14/08/97, at 7 (Oct. 8, 1997).
[48] Id.
[49] Id.
[50]
Human Rights Watch,
supra note 32 .
[51]
Henry J. Steiner & Philip
Alston, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals
14 (2d ed. 2000) (quoting Barbara Crossett, 1,500
Executions Cited for Iraq in Past Year, Mostly for Politics,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 14,
1998, at A1).
[52] Id.
[53] See generally
Raul Hilberg, The
Destruction of the European Jews 267 (1985).
[54] Amnesty
International Report 2002, Iraq 1-3 (2002).
[55] Id.
[56] Id.
[57] Id.
[58] Id.
[59] Id.
[60] Human Rights
Questions: Human Rights Situations and Reports of and
Representatives: Situation of Human Rights in Iraq, U.N. GAOR, 57th
Sess., Agenda Item 111 (c), at 8, U.N. Doc. A/57/325 (2002). The
reports came from the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the
Commission on Human Rights, along with the Rapporteur on Torture and
the Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions.
[61] Id.
[62] Id.
[63] Id.
[64] Human Rights
Questions: Human Rights Situations and Reports of Special
Rapporteurs and Representatives: Situation of Human Rights in Iraq,
U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 100, at 44-59, U.N. Doc.
A/49/651 (1994).
[65] Id. at
44-59.
[66] Bureau Of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Country Reports On Human
Rights Practices-Iraq (2002), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18277.htm
(last visited April 7, 2004).
[67] Id.
[68] Id.
Hussein personally signed each decree.
[69] Human Rights
Questions: Human Rights Situations and Reports of Special
Rapporteurs and Representatives: Situation of Human Rights in Iraq,
U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 116(c), at 12, U.N. Doc.
A/55/294 (2000).
[70] Id.
[71] Id. at 20.
[72] G.A. Res. 55/115,
U.N. GAOR, 81st Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/115 (2000).
[73]Id.
[74] This article will
examine only the deportation, imprisonment, severe deprivation of
physical liberties, and torture of the Kurdish population.
[75] See, e.g.,
Amnesty International Report 2002, supra note 54 , at 1-3; A
Decade Of Deception And Defiance: Saddam Hussein’s Defiance Of The
United Nations 11-17 (2002) (White House Background Paper)
available at http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/13456.htm (last
visited April 7, 2004).
[76] President George
W. Bush, Address to the Nation on the Capture of Saddam Hussein
(Dec. 14, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031214-3.html
(last visited Jan. 19, 2004).
[77] Until fairly
recently, outside states struggled to find a legal justification for
jurisdiction over diplomatic figures, particularly when the
international community refused to act. The Introductory Comment to
the Harvard Research Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect
to Crime 1935 listed five general principles, in order of
jurisdiction consideration. The “territorial principle,” determining
jurisdiction by reference to the place where the offense was
committed, was of primary importance; the “nationality principle,”
determining jurisdiction by reference to the nationality or national
character of the person committing the offense, was also universally
accepted; the “protective principle,” determining jurisdiction by
reference to the national interest injured by the offense, was
recognized in most states; the “universality principle,” determining
jurisdiction by reference to the custody of the person committing
the offense, was widely accepted, but not universal; and finally,
the “passive personality principle,” determining jurisdiction by
reference to the nationality or national character of the person
injured by the offense, was considered auxiliary in character an
probably not essential if the ends were served by any other
principle. D.J. Harris, Cases
and Materials on International Law 264-66 (5th ed. 1998).
The universality principal resembles
humani generis theory. Hostes humani generis means
“enemies of the human race.”
Black’s Law Dictionary, 742 (7th ed.
1999). Authorities could apprehend perpetrators who committed
acts considered universally reprehensible wherever they went. The
theory originally applied only to pirates. See id.; see
also Edith Y. Wu, Saddam Hussein as Hostes Humani Generis?
Should the U.S. Intervene?, 26
Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com.
55, 56 (1998).
[78] The Harvard
Research Draft Convention proposed universal jurisdiction in the
following situations:
Article 10:
(a) When committed in a place not
subject to its authority but subject to the authority of another
state, if the act or omission which constitutes the crime is also an
offence by the law of the place where it was committed, if surrender
of the alien for prosecution has been offered to such other state or
states and the offer remains unaccepted, and if prosecution is not
barred by lapse of time under the law of the place where the crime
was committed. The penalty imposed shall in no case be more severe
than the penalty prescribed for the same act or omission by the law
of the place where the crime was committed.
(b) When committed in a place not
subject to the authority of any state, if the act or omission which
constitutes the crime is also an offence by the law of a state of
which the alien is a national, if surrender of the alien for
prosecution remains unaccepted, and if prosecution is not barred by
lapse of time under the law of a state of which the alien is a
national. The penalty imposed shall in no case be more severe than
the penalty prescribed for the same act or omission by the law of a
state of which the alien is a national.
(c) When committed in a place not
subject to the authority of any state, if the crime was committed to
the injury of the state assuming jurisdiction, or of one of its
nationals, or of a corporation or juristic person having its
national character.
(d) When committed in a place not
subject to the authority of any state and the alien is not a
national of any state.
Harris, supra
note 77 , at 288-89
(internal citations omitted).
[79] Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States §§
404, 423 (1987).
[80]
International Council On
Human Rights Policy, Hard Cases: Bringing Human Rights Violators To
Justice Abroad 4-5 (1999).
[81] Id. at 9-10.
[82] Id. at
11-12.
[83] Id. at 16.
[84] Id.
[85] Single Convention
on Narcotic Drugs, Art. 36(2)(iv), 520 U.N.T.S. 204 (1965); see
also 1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs,
Art. 4(2)(b), Misc. 14 (1989); D.P.P. v. Doot, [1973] A.C. 807, HL
(Lord Wilberforce).
[86] Hague Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 1970, Art. 4,
860 U.N.T.S. 105 (1971).
[87] Montreal
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety
of Civil Aviation 1971, Art. 5, 10 I.L.M. 1151 (1974).
[88] 1979
International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, Art. 5, 18
I.L.M. 1456, entered into force 1983.
[89] 1984 United
Nations Torture Convention, Art. 5(2), 23 I.L.M. 1027, entered
into force 1987 [hereinafter Torture Convention]; see also
Ahcene Boulesbaa, An Analysis of the 1984 Draft Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, 4 Dick. J.
Int’l L. 185 (1986).
[90] Convention on the
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid 1973, Art.
II-IV, 13 I.L.M. 50, entered into force 1976.
[91] Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally
Protected Persons including Diplomats 1973, Art. 2, 1035 U.N.T.S.
167, entered into force 1977.
[92] For more
information on piracy, see Edwin D. Dickinson, Is the Crime of
Piracy Obsolete?, 38 Harv.
L. Rev. 334, 335-39 (1925).
[93] The list of
crimes considered eligible for universal jurisdiction in the United
States constantly expands. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (making several
references to domestic jurisdiction over extraterritorial offenses
under the universality principal but ultimately deciding to dismiss
the action); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir.
1980) (likening the defendant, a Paraguayan torturer to pirates and
slave traders, the quintessential defendants eligible for universal
jurisdiction); Von Dardel v. Union of Socivet Socialist Republics,
623 F. Supp. 246, 254 (D.D.C. 1985) (mentioning the “concept of
extraordinary judicial jurisdiction over acts in violation of
significant international standards . . . embodied in the principle
of ‘universal’ violations of international law”); In re
Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544, 555 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (deciding that
Israel’s jurisdiction to prosecute a guard from a concentration camp
“conforms with the international law principle of universal
jurisdiction”), aff’d sub nom, Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776
F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986);
United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212, 223 (N.D. Cal. 1981)
(recognizing universal jurisdiction to punish terrorist acts against
internationally protected persons such as diplomats); William W.
Burke-White, Regionalization of International Criminal Law
Enforcement: A Preliminary Exploration, 38
Tex. Int’l L.J. 729, 732 (discussing
the trend toward regional international law enforcement).
[94] Layton,
509 F. Supp. at 223.
[95] The Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. 667, 712 (1900).
[96] Demjanjuk,
776 F.2d at 582.
[97]
Restatement (Third) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States §§ 404 cmt. b(1)
(1987).
[98] 18 U.S.C. § 1091
(2000):
(a) Basic
offense.--Whoever, whether in time of peace or in time of war, in a
circumstance described in subsection (d) and with the specific
intent to destroy, in whole or in substantial part, a national,
ethnic, racial, or religious group as such--
(1) kills members of that group;
(2) causes serious bodily injury to
members of that group;
(3) causes the permanent impairment of
the mental faculties of members of the group through drugs, torture,
or similar techniques;
(4) subjects the group to conditions
of life that are intended to cause the physical destruction of the
group in whole or in part;
(5) imposes measures intended to
prevent births within the group; or
(6) transfers by force children of the
group to another group;
or
attempts to do so, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).
(b)
Punishment for basic offense.--The punishment for an offense under
subsection (a) is--
(1) in the case of an offense under
subsection (a)(1) where death results, by death or imprisonment for
life and a fine of not more than $1,000,000, or both; and
(2) a fine of not more than $1,000,000
or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both, in any
other case.
(c)
Incitement offense.--Whoever in a circumstance described in
subsection (d) directly and publicly incites another to violate
subsection (a) shall be fined not more than $500,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both.
(d)
Required circumstance for offenses.--The circumstance referred to in
subsections (a) and (c) is that--
(1) the offense is committed within
the United States; or
(2) the alleged offender is a national
of the United States (as defined in section 101 of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C. 1101)).
(e)
Non-applicability of certain limitations.--Notwithstanding
section 3282 of this title, in the case of an offense under
subsection (a)(1), an indictment may be found, or information
instituted, at any time without limitation.
[99] See
Restatement (Third) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 404 cmt. b(1)
(1987).
[100] Attorney General
of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 Int’l L. Rep. 50 (Sup Ct. Israel 1962).
Eichmann administered a policy that killed approximately 4,600,000
Jews. Harris, supra
note 77 , at 280 (quoting
Reitlinger, The Final Solution (1953)).
[101] Attorney-General
of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (D.C. Jm. 1961). For more
information on the Eichmann trial and the use of the universality
principle, see Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under
International Law, 66
Tex. L. Rev. 785, 810 (1988).
[102] In re
Extradition of Demjanjuk, 603 F. Supp. 1468 (N.D. Ohio 1985),
affirmed 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 457
U.S. 1016 (1986).
[103] Id.
[104] See G.A.
Res. 95(I), 1 U.N.GAOR, U.N.Doc. A/64/Add.1, at 188 (1946); see
also Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. at 555 n.11 (quoting Article 6).
[105] 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(2000); see also Tachiona v. Mugabe, 234 F. Supp. 2d 401 (S.D.N.Y.
2002); Mark E. Wojcik et al., International Human Rights, 37
Int’l Law. 597, 602 (2003).
[106] Torture Victim
Protection Act of 1991, § 1 et seq., 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
[107] Id.
[108] Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980); see also
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 425
(2d Cir. 1987), rev’d on other grounds, 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
[109] Kadic v.
Karadizic, 70 F.3d 232, 243 (2d Cir. 1995); see also
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980).
[110] Article 4 of the
Convention states:
1. Each State Party shall ensure that
all acts of torture are offenses under its criminal law. The same
shall apply to an attempt to commit torture and to an act by any
person which constitutes complicity or participation in torture.
2. Each State Party shall make these
offences punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account
their grave nature.
Torture Convention, supra note
89 .
The United States recently
opposed an Optional Protocol to the Convention. The Protocol
established procedures for inspecting suspected torture detention
facilities. Some credit this hesitation to the United States own
treatment of prisoners from Operation Iraqi Freedom/the War on
Terrorism. Wojcik, supra note 105 , at 598.
[111] See
Torture Convention, supra note 89 .
[112] G.A. Res. 46, 39
U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51, at 197 (providing for universal jurisdiction
in its Introductory Note to Part VII).
[113] See
Monica Hans, Providing for Uniformity in the Exercise of
Universal Jurisdiction: Can Either the Princeton Principles on
Universal Jurisdiction or an International Criminal Court Accomplish
This Goal?, 15 Transnat’l
Law. 357, 379 (2002).
[114] Regina v. Bow
Street Magistrate, 1 A.C. 147 (H.L. 1999)..
[115] Case Concerning
the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the
Congo v. Belgium), 2002 ICJ General List No. 121 (Feb. 14, 2002),
available at http://212.153.43.18/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobejudgment/icobe_ijudgment_20020214.PDF
(last visited Apr. 21, 2004).
[116] Regina v. Bow
Street Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No.3), [2000] 1 A.C.
147 (House of Lords 1999).
[117] Id.
[118] Id.
[119] International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, entered into force
1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. Article 6 states:
1. Every human being has the inherent
right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of his life.
2. In countries which have not
abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only
for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at
the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the
provisions of the present Covenant and to the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can
only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a
competent court.
3. When deprivation of life
constitutes the crime of genocide, it is understood that noting in
this article shall authorize any State Party to the present Covenant
to derogate in any way from any obligation assumed under the
provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide.
4. Anyone sentenced to death shall
have the right to seek pardon or commutation of the sentence.
Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence of death may be
granted in all cases.
5. Sentence of death shall not be
imposed for crimes committed by persons below 18 years of age and
shall not be carried out on pregnant women.
6. Nothing in this article shall be
invoked to delay or prevent the abolition of capital punishment by
any State Party to the present Covenant.
Id.
[120] Regina v. Bow
Street Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No.3), [2000] 1 A.C.
284-90 (House of Lords 1999); see also Sarah C. Rispin,
Development, Implications of Democratic Republic of the Congo
v. Belgium on the Pinochet Precedent: A Setback for International
Human Rights Litigation? 3
Chi. J. Int’l L. 527,
531 (2002).
[121] See Case
Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic
of the Congo v. Belgium), 2002 ICJ General List No. 121 , at para.
58 (Feb. 14, 2002), available at http://212.153.43.18/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobejudgment/icobe_ijudgment_20020214.PDF;
Mark A. Summers, The International Court of Justice’s Decision in
Congo v. Belgium: How Has it Affected the Development of A
Principle of Universal Jurisdiction That Would Obligate All States
to Prosecute War Criminals?, 21 B.U.
Int’l L.J. 63 (2003).
[122] Rispin, supra
note 120 , at 529.
[123] Regina v. Bow
Street Magistrate, 1 A.C. 147 (H.L. 1999).
[124] Case Concerning
the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the
Congo v. Belgium), 2002 ICJ General List No. 121, at para. 61 (Feb.
14, 2002), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobejudgment/icobe_ijudgment_toc.htm.
[125] Regina v. Bow
Street Magistrate, 1 A.C. 147 (H.L. 1999).
[126] United Nations:
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 37
I.L.M. 999, 1003 (1998) [hereinafter International Criminal Court].
[127] See Damir
Arnaut, When in Rome . . .? The International Criminal Court and
Avenues for U.S. Participation, 43
Va. J. Int’l L. 525,
526 (2003).
[128] The ICC may
exercise its jurisdiction if an alleged crime occurred in a
signatory state’s territory or if the crime was committed by a
national of a signatory state. Arnaut, supra note 127 , at
538. Thus, if the United States signed the Rome Statute and could
establish a link between Saddam Hussein and the bombings of the
World Trade Center on September 11, 2000, then the ICC may have
jurisdiction over the dispute. Otherwise, it initially seems that
either a national citizen of that state party must commit the crime,
or the crime must occur in a state party’s territory. Id.
[129] The United
States has not signed the Rome Statute either.
[130] Article 12(2),
13(b); Arnaut, supra note 127 , at 538.
[131] See
Statute of the International Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia,
Annex, art. 4, U.N. Doc. S/25704, reprinted in 32 I.L.M.
1159, 1193, adopted pursuant to S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th
Sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993)[hereinafter
ICTY Statute]; Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda,
S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., Annex, art. 2,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/955
(1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598, 1602 [hereinafter
ICTR Statute].
[132] S.C. Res. 688,
U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982nd mtg., at 31, U.N. Doc. S/RES/688v
(1991).
[133] Id. at
31-32 (emphasis added). Since the International Criminal Court was
not in existence when this Resolution was issued, the Security
Council did not have this option in mind. This does not, however,
preclude the Security Council from using the ICC as one of its
resources today.
[134] Diane Marie
Amann & M.N.S. Sellers, American Law in a Time of Global
Interdependence: U.S. National Reports to the XVIth International
Congress of Comparative Law: Section IV The United States of America
and the International Criminal Court, 50
Am. J. Comp. L. 381,
381 (2002); see also Arnaut, supra note 127 , at 538; Colonel
M. Tia Johnson, The American Servicemembers’ Protection Act:
Protecting Whom?, 43 Va.
J. Int’l L. 405, 430-33 (2003). Mohamed El Zeidy, The
United States Dropped the Atomic Bomb of Article 16 of the ICC
Statute: Security Council Power of Deferrals and Resolution 1422,
35 Vand. J. Transnat’l L.
1503, 1505-09 (2002).
[135] Arnaut, supra
note 127 , at 542.
[136] See generally
Jonathan M.H. Short, Note, Sexual Violence as Genocide: The
Developing Law of the International Criminal Tribunals and the
International Criminal Court, 8
Mich. J. Race & L. 503, 505
(2003) (using the Rome Statute as a guide).
[137] See
Theodore Meron, International Criminalization of Internal
Atrocities, 89 Am. J.
Int’l. L. 554 (1995); Mark A. Summers, The International
Court of Justice’s Decision in Congo v. Belgium: How Has it
Affected the Development of A Principle of Universal Jurisdiction
that Would Obligate All States to Prosecute War Criminals?,
21 B.U. Int’l L.J. 63, 65
(2003).
[138] See supra
note 131 .
[139] ICTY Statute,
supra note 131 , at introduction ¶ 10.
[140] ICTR Statute,
supra note 131 , at chapeau (introduction).
[141] See
Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi, Decision on the Defense Motion on
Jurisdiction, Case No. ICTR-96-15-T, 19-29 (ICTR Trial Chamber June
18, 1997), available at
http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/cases/Kanyabashi/decisions/180697.pdf
(last visited February 16, 2004); Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on
the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case
No. IT-94-1-AR72, PP 14-48 (ICTY App. Chamber Oct. 2, 1995),
available at
http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/decision-e/51002.htm (last
visited February 16, 2004).
[142] Report of the
Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council
Resolution 808, P 29, U.N. Docs. S/25704, S/25704/Corr.1 (1993),
reprinted in 2
Virginia Morris
& Michael Scharf, An Insider's Guide to the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
8 (1995), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/S25704.htm (last
visited February 16, 2004). The fluid nature of international law
and the lack of agreement on points of customary law may make it
difficult for the ICTY to apply this rough statutory guide that
incorporates customary international law.
[143] William W.
Burke-White, A Community of Courts: Toward A System of
International Criminal Law Enforcement, 24
Mich. J. Int’l L. 1,
12-13 (2002).
[144]
Iraqi National Congress,
supra note 32 , at 115-29.
[145] Talks
establishing the United Nations-sanctioned human rights tribunal for
the Khmer Rouge failed after five years of discussion due to
concerns that the tribunal would not ensure impartiality,
independence, or objectivity. Daniel K. Donovan, Recent Development,
Joint U.N.-Cambodia Efforts to Establish A Khmer Rouge Tribunal,
44 Harv. Int’l L.J. 551, 551
(2003). In January of 2003, the United Nations and Cambodia
reunited to renew discussions about creating a tribunal that would
address human rights atrocities committed in Cambodia from 1975 to
1979. Id. During the initial discussions, a United Nations
appointed panel considered establishing a domestic Cambodian
tribunal, an ad hoc international tribunal, a hybrid Cambodian
tribunal under United Nations administration, an international
tribunal set up through a multilateral treaty, and trials in various
states. Id. at 557. However, the panel ultimately decided
that an ad hoc international tribunal best served the needs of
Cambodians and the international community. They suggested that the
prosecutor for the ICTR and the ICTY lead the Cambodian tribunal.
Id. The same process should apply to Iraq.
[146] Critics have
disparaged the ITCR for holding trials in Arusha, Tanzania because
of its geographic distance from Rwanda. However, the proximity of
Arusha to Kigali allows witnesses and victims to travel to the
trials. Burke-White, supra note 93 , at 736.
[147] International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
[148] International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S.
171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976 [hereinafter ICCPR],
available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/b3ccpr/htm (last visited
February 16, 2004).
[149] International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
opened for signature Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 165.
[150] Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.
opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13. Although
Iraq signed CEDAW, it made numerous reservations for Islamic law.
These reservations effectually nullify CEDAW. See L.
Elizabeth Chamblee, Rhetoric or Rights?: When Culture and
Religion Bar Girls’ Right to Education, 44
Va. J. Int’l L.
(forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 14-15, on file with author).
[151] Convention on
the Rights of the Child, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989,
1577 U.N.T.S. 3. Iraq also made reservations to this treaty that
prevented children from changing their religion. See
International Obligations and Access to Remedies: Iraq, at
http://www.right-to-education.org/content/rights_and_remedies/iraq.html
(last visited Mar. 14, 2004). For current status of Iraq’s treaty
ratifications, see Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights, Status of Ratifications of the Principal
International Human Rights Treaties, Dec. 9, 2002.
[152] G.A. Res.
1994/203, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/203, at 1 (1994), available at
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/49/a49r203.htm (last visited
February 16, 2004).
[153] The Vienna
Convention, a multinational treaty prepared by the United Nations,
codifies customary international law governing international
agreements. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (entered into force
Jan. 27, 1980)[hereinafter Vienna Convention]. For more information
on the interrelation between treaties and customary international
law, see Evan Criddle, The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties in U.S. Treaty Interpretation, 44
Va. J. Int’l L. 431 (2004).
[154]
Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 702 (1987). A
number of courts have relied on this section of the Restatement.
See, e.g., Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440, 448 (2d Cir.
2000); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir. 1995); Diderman
de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 715 (9th Cir.
1992); De Sanchez v. Banco Central De Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1397
(5th Cir. 1985); Chiminya Tachiona v. Mugabe, 216 F. Supp. 2d 262,
266 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Mehinovic v. Vukovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322,
1348 (N.D. Ga. 2002); Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116,
1152 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Bao Ge v. Li Peng, 201 F. Supp. 2d 14, 22 (D.D.C.
2000); Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239, 1252 (S.D.
Fla. 1997); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 362,
371-73, 376 (E.D. La. 1997); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, 978 F.
Supp. 1078, 1093 (S.D. Fla. 1997); Caballero v. Caplinger, 914 F.
Supp. 1374, 1379 (E.D. La. 1996); Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F.
Supp. 887, 903 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
[155]
Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 702 cmt. n
(1987).
[156] A norm is
fundamental to international law and permits no derogation if there
is widespread consensus among the states that it cannot be
disregarded for any reason. The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties codified the concept of jus cogens. Article 53 of the
Vienna Convention states that a “treaty is void if, at the time of
its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general
international law.” It then defines “norm” as “a norm accepted and
recognized by the international community of States as a whole a
norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified
only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the
same character.” Vienna Convention, supra note 153 , at art.
53; see also Gordon A. Christenson, The World Court and
Jus Cogens, 81 Am. J.
Int’l L. 93, 95 n.9 (1987).
[157]
Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in
Occupied Europe 79 (H. Fertig 1944), available at
http://www.preventgenocide.org/lemkin/AxisRule1944-1.htm (last
visited February 16, 2004).
[158] Charter of the
International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1546, 82
U.N.T.S. 284, reprinted in 41 A.J.I.L. 172 (1947) [hereinafter
Nuremberg Charter], available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/imtconst.htm (last
visited February 16, 2004).
[159] 2 Trial of the
Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal 45-46
(1947) (indictment, Count Three), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/count3.htm
(last visited Apr. 21, 2004).
[160] 3
M. Cherif Bassiouni,
International Criminal Law 127 (Transnational Publishers
1987) (summarizing dispositions and outcomes of the Nuremberg
Trial).
[161] See generally
Nuremberg Charter, supra note 158 ; see also
Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case no. ICTR-95-1-T, para. 88,
(ICTR Trial Chamber, May 21, 1999) (“The Genocide Convention is
undeniably considered part of customary international law. . . .”);
Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, para. 15 (ICTR Trial
Chamber, Jan. 27, 2000).
[162] Allied Control
Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes,
Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity, Dec. 20, 1945,
available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/imt10.htm (last visited
February 16, 2004) [hereinafter Allied Control Council Law].
[163] See, e.g.,
Case No. 35, Trial of Josef Alstötter and Others, 6 L. Rep.
Trials War Crims., 1, 74-76 (1948); Case No. 73, Trial of Ulrich
Greifelt and Others, 8 L. Rep. Trials War Crims., 1 (1949),
available at http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/WCC/greifelt1.htm (last
visited Apr. 21, 2004).
[164] Alstötter,
6 L. Rep. Trials War Crims. at 83 n.3.
[165] Greifelt,
8 L. Rep. Trials War Crims. at 3.
[166] See Trial
of Gauleiter Artur Greiser, in 13 L. Rep. Trials War Crim. 70, 80-84
(1949); Case No. 37, Trial of Hauptsturmführer Amon Leopold Goeth, 7
L. Rep. Trials War Crims. 1 (1948); Case No. 38, Trial of
Obersturmbannführer Rudolf Franz Ferdinand Hoess, 7 L. Rep. Trials
War Crims. 11 (1948).
[167] See David
L. Nersessian, The Contours of Genocidal Intent: Troubling
Jurisprudence from the International Criminal Tribunals, 37
Tex. Int’l L. J. 231,
254 (2002).
[168] Law in the
United States adds to the offenses listed in the Genocide
Convention, criminalizing an act behavior that “causes the permanent
impairment of the mental faculties of members of the group through
drugs, torture, or similar techniques.” 18 U.S.C. § 1091(a)(3)
(2000).
[169] Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1951), adopted by G.A. Res. 260(A)(III), U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 174, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter
Genocide Convention], available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/p_genoci.htm (last visited
February 16, 2004).
[170] See
Nersessian, supra note 169 at 256.
[171] Genocide
Convention, supra note 169 , at Art. III.
[172]
Harris, supra
note 77 , at 1048
(providing the text of the United Nations Charter).
[173]
Human Rights Watch/Middle
East, supra note, at 1-2; see also
Iraqi National Congress,
supra note 32 , at 70-71.
[174]
Human Rights Watch/Middle
East, supra note, at 1. Ali Hassan Al-Majid, or
“Chemical Ali”, recorded a number of meetings with senior Ba’ath
officials in 1988 and 1989. In March 1991, a number of these tapes
were found in Iraqi government offices and from al-Majid’s home in
Kurkuk and given to Human Rights Watch. In one of these tapes, dated
May 26, 1988, Chemical Ali stated:
We continued the deportations. I told
the mustashars that they might say that they like their
villages and that they won't leave. I said I cannot let your village
stay because I will attack it with chemical weapons. Then you and
your family will die. You must leave right now. Because I cannot
tell you the same day that I am going to attack with chemical
weapons. I will kill them all with chemical weapons! Who is going to
say anything? The international community? Fuck them! The
international community and those who listen to them.
Human Rights Watch,
supra note 15 ,
at appendix A.
[175]
Human Rights Watch,
supra note 15 , at 345, available at
http://hrw.org/reports/1993/iraqanfal/ANFAL13.htm (last visited
February 17, 2004).
[176] The Anfal
Campaign was organized into eight stages, however for the purposes
of this Article, similar genocidal acts will be examined
collectively.
[177] Harry de
Quetteville, Iraqis Cheer as Troops Capture Chemical Ali,
Telegraph, Aug. 22,
2003, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2003/08/22/wirq22.xml
(last visited Feb. 22, 2004).
[178]
Human Rights Watch/Middle
East, supra note, at 259.
[179] “Barzani” is the
name of a charismatic Kurdish tribal leader who led an insurgence
against Hussein.
[180]
Human Rights Watch,
supra note 15 , at 41, available at
http://hrw.org/reports/1993/iraqanfal/ANFAL1.htm (last visited
February 17, 2004).
[181] Id.
(quoting Al-Iraq, September 13, 1983).
[182]
Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 404 cmt. A
(1987).
[183]See ICCPR,
supra note 148 .
[184] See
Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T, para 5, (ICTR
Trial Chamber, June 7, 2001).
[185] See id.
[186] Genocide
Convention, supra note 169 , at Article II (c).
[187] Case No.
ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, section 6.3.1 (ICTR Trial Chamber I, Sept. 2,
1998). The court favorably cites
Nehemiah Robinson, The
Genocide Convention: A Commentary 63 (1960).
[188] Attorney General
of the Government of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 340 (D.C.
Jerusalem 1961).
[189] In Prosecutor
v. Akayesu, the court stated:
Genocide is distinct from other crimes
insomuch as it embodies a special intent or dolus specialis.
Special intent of a crime is the specific intention, required as a
constructive element of the crime, which demands that the
perpetrator clearly seeks to produce the act charged. Thus the
special intent in the crime of genocide lies in “the intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group.” The Chamber found that “the offender is culpable
only when he has committed one of the offences charged under Article
2(2) . . . with the clear intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
particular group. The offender is culpable because he knew or should
have known that the act committed would destroy, in whole or in
part, a group.”
Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, para. 498,
517-22 (ICTR Trial Chamber I, Sept. 2, 1998); see also
Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, para. 15 (ICTR Trial
Chamber, Jan. 27, 2000).
[190] See
Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20, para. 313 (ICTR Trial
Chamber, May 15, 2003) (“A perpetrator’s mens rea may be
inferred from his actions.”); Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No.
ICTR-95-1A-T, para. 63 (ICTR Trial Chamber, June 7, 2001) (“[E]vidence
of the context of the alleged culpable acts may help the Chamber to
determine the intention of the Accused, especially where the
intention is not clear from what the person says or does. The
Chamber notes, however, that the use of context to determine the
intent of an accused must be counterbalanced with the actual conduct
of the Accused. The Chamber is of the opinion that the Accused’s
intent should be determined, above all, from his words and deeds,
and should be evident from patterns of purposeful action.”);
Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3, para. 61-63 (ICTR Trial
Chamber, May 21, 1999);
[191]
Human Rights Watch,
supra note 15 , at 78 n.40.
[192] Id.
[193] Id.
[194] Id.*
[195] Id.
at 81- 84.
[196]
Id.
[197] Prosecutor v.
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, section 6.3.1 (ICTR Trial
Chamber I, Sept. 2, 1998).
[198] See
Iraqi National Congress,
supra note 32 , at 136-69 (displaying photocopies of
the actual documents); Human
Rights Watch/Middle East, supra note 15, at 62. In
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, the court noted that because intent is a
mental factor that is often difficult to determine, the prosecutor
could use the following factors to prove intent “in the absence of a
confession from the accused”:
·
“the general context of the perpetration of other culpable
acts systematically directed against that same group, whether . . .
committed by the same offender or by others;”
·
“the scale of atrocities committed;”
·
the “general nature” of the atrocities committed “in a region
or a country;”
·
“the fact of deliberately and systematically targeting
victims on account of their membership of a particular group, while
excluding the members of other groups;”
·
“the general political doctrine which gave rise to the acts;”
·
“the reputation of destructive and discriminatory acts;” or
·
“the perpetration of acts which violate, or which the
perpetrators themselves consider to violate the very foundation of
the group—acts which are not in themselves covered by the list . . .
but which are committed as part of the same pattern of conduct.”
Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, para. 523-24 (ICTR
Trial Chamber I, Sept. 2, 1998). The tribunal in Prosecutor v.
Kayishema and Ruzindana agreed with the tribunal in Akayesu
and stated that the accused’s “action, including circumstantial
evidence, however may provide sufficient evidence of intent,” and
“intent can be inferred either from words or deeds and may be
demonstrated by a pattern of purposeful action.” The tribunal
included the following factors as relevant indicators of a pattern
of purposeful action:
·
“the number of group members affected;”
·
“the physical targeting of the group or their property;”
·
“the use of derogatory language toward members of the
targeted group;”
·
“the weapons employed and the extent of bodily injury;”
·
“the methodical way of planning;”
·
“the systematic manner of killing;” and
·
“the relative proportionate scale of the actual or attempted
destruction of a group.”
Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, para. 93, 527 (ICTR
Trial Chamber, June 7, 2001).
[199]
Human Rights Watch,
supra note 15 , at 61-62.
[200] However,
premeditation is not a necessary element.
[201] Knowles,
supra note 15 , at 152.
[202] Genocide
Convention, supra note 169 , at Article II (b).
[203] Case No.
ICTR-95-1-T, para. 108-13 (ICTR Trial Chamber, June 7, 2001).
[204] Id.
[205] Prosecutor v.
Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3, para. 51 (ICTR Trial Chamber, May 21,
1999).
[206] See
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, para. 502 (ICTR Trial
Chamber I, Sept. 2, 1998).
[207] Human Rights
Questions: Human Rights Situations and Reports of Special
Rapporteurs and Representatives: Situation of Human Rights in Iraq,
U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 116(c), at 3-7, U.N. Doc.
A/55/294 (2000).
[208]
Iraqi National Congress,
supra note 32 , at 167.
[209] Prosecutor v.
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, section 6.3.1 (ICTR Trial
Chamber I, Sept. 2, 1998).
[210] Genocide
Convention, supra note 169 , at Article II.
[211]Id.
[212] Knowles,
supra note 15 , at 154.
[213]Id.
[214] Prosecutor v.
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, section 3 (ICTR Trial
Chamber I, Sept. 2, 1998).
[215]Id.
[216]
Human Rights Watch,
supra note 15 , at 52-53.
[217]
Iraqi National Congress,
supra note 32 , at 136-69 (providing exact copies of
the documents exchanged within the Iraqi government).
[218] “[C]onspiracy to
commit genocide is to be defined as an agreement between two or more
persons to commit the crime of genocide.” Prosecutor v. Musema, Case
No. ICTR-96-13-A, para. 798 (ICTR Trial Chamber, Jan. 27, 2000). For
a detailed analysis of the elements for conspiracy to commit
genocide, see Human Rights
Watch, Genocide, War Crimes, and Crimes Against Humanity: Topical
Digests of the Case Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (2004).
[219] The tribunal in
Prosecutor v. Akayesu stated:
[D]irect and public incitement must be
defined . . . as directly provoking the perpetrator(s) to commit
genocide, whether through speeches, shouting or threats uttered in
public places or at public gatherings, or through the sale or
dissemination, offer for sale or display of written material or
printed matter in public places or at public gatherings, or through
the public display of placards or posters, or through any other
means of audiovisual communication.
Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, para.
559 (ICTR Trial Chamber I, Sept. 2, 1998).
[220] In Prosecutor
v. Semanza, the tribunal defined complicity in genocide. Case
No. ICTR-97-20, para. 393 (ICTR Trial Chamber, May 15, 2003). It
stated, “prior jurisprudence has defined the term complicity as
adding and abetting, instigating, and procuring.” Id.
“[C]omplicity to commit genocide in Article 2(3) refers to all acts
of assistance of encouragement that have substantially contributed
to, or have had a substantial effect on, the completion of the crime
of genocide.” Id. at para. 395.
[221] Knowles,
supra note 15 , at 156.
[222]
Christine Moss Helms, Iraq:
Eastern Flank of the Arab World 12 (1984).
[223] See
Human Rights Watch World Report 1989, Human
Rights Watch, available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1989/WR89/Iraq.htm#TopOfPage (last
visited Feb. 21, 2004).
[224] James D. Fry,
Comment, Terrorism as a Crime Against Humanity and Genocide: The
Backdoor to Universal Jurisdiction, 7
UCLA J. Int’l L. & Foreign
Aff. 169, 183 (2002) (citing
Adam Hochschild, King
Leopold’s Ghost 112, 317 n.112 (1998)).
[225] Id.
[226] Nuremberg
Charter, supra note 158 .
[227] Id. at
Art. 6 (c).
[228] See G.A.
Res. 96, U.N. Doc. A/236 (1946); see also Fry, supra
note 225 , at 184.
[229] Charter of the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946,
art. 5(c), T.I.A.S. No. 1589, 4 Bevans 20 (as amended, Apr. 26,
1946, 4 Bevans 27), reprinted in 2
Substantive and Procedural
Aspects of International Criminal Law 73 (Gabrielle Kirk
McDonald et al. eds., 2000).
[230] Allied Control
Council Law supra note 162 . The entire section reads:
Atrocities and Offences, including,
but not limited to, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation,
imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts committed
against any civilian population or persecutions on political, racial
or religious grounds in execution or in connection with any crime
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation
of the domestic laws of the country where perpetrated.
[231] Aspects of
Establishing an International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for the Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia, Report by the Secretary-General, 48th Sess., Annex, U.N.
Doc. S/25704 (1993), art. 5, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159; see
also ICTY Statute, supra note 131 .
[232] ICTR Statute,
supra note 131 , at chapeau.
[233] Fry, supra
note 225 , at 185.
[234] The
International Criminal Court: Elements Of Crimes And Rules Of
Procedure And Evidence 63 (Roy S. Lee et. al. eds.,
2001)[hereinafter International Criminal Court Elements].
[235] Case No.
IT-94-T, Opinion and Judgment, paras. 647-48 (ICTY Trial Chamber II,
May 7, 1997).
[236] Prosecutor v.
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, para. 580 (ICTR Trial
Chamber I, Sept. 2, 1998).
[237] Id.
[238] See
Guenael Mettraux, Crimes Against Humanity in the Jurisprudence of
the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and
for Rwanda, 43 Harv.
Int’l L. J. 237, 244 (2002).
[239] See infra
Part V.C.
[240] Mettraux,
supra note 238 , at 245.
[241] Prosecutor v.
Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2, Review of Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61
of Rules of Procedure and Evidence, para. 27 (Oct. 20, 1995).
[242]Id.
[243] Prosecutor v.
Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, para. 578 (ICTR Trial Chamber, Sept.
2, 1998).
[244] See infra
Part V.C.2.a.
[245] See infra
Part V.C.2.a.
[246] See infra
Part V.C.3.
[247] See
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23, Judgment, para. 418 (Feb.
22, 2001). The ICTY adds the element that the crimes against
humanity occur in an armed conflict, but does not require a nexus
between the accused acts and the armed conflict.
[248] See
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Opinion and Judgment, para.
649 (May 7, 1997) (stating, “a single act by a perpetrator taken
within the context of a widespread or systematic attack against a
civilian population entails individual criminal responsibility and
an individual perpetrator need not commit numerous offenses to be
held liable”); see also Prosecutor v. Mrksic, Case IT-95-13a,
Review of the Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of Rules of Procedure
and Evidence, para. 29-30 (April 3, 1996).
[249] See
Mettraux, supra note 238 , at 255.
[250] Prosecutor v.
Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20, para. 326 (ICTR Trial Chamber, May 15,
2003). “The concept of ‘widespread’ may be defined as massive,
frequent, large scale action, carried out collectively with
considerable seriousness and directed against a multiplicity of
victims.” Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, para. 580 (ICTR
Trial Chamber, Sept. 2, 1998). “The concept of ‘systematic’ may be
defined as thoroughly organised and following a regular pattern on
the basis of a common policy involving substantial public or private
resources. There is no requirement that this policy must be adopted
formally as the policy of a state. There must however be some kind
of preconceived plan or policy.” Id.
[251] “Members of the
civilian population are people who are not taking any active part in
the hostilities including members of the armed forces who laid down
their arms and those persons placed hors de combat by
sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause. Id. at para.
582. Yet, this requirement “does not mean that the entire population
of a given State or territory must be victimised by these acts in
order for the acts to constitute a crime against humanity.”
Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T, para 80, (ICTR
Trial Chamber, June 7, 2001). “Instead the ‘population’ element is
intended to imply crimes of a collective nature and thus excludes
single or isolated acts which, although possibly constituting crimes
under national penal legislation, do not rise to the level of crimes
against humanity.” Id.
[252] See
Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, Judgment, para. 207 (March
3, 2000); see also Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10,
Judgment, para. 53 (Dec. 14, 1999).
[253] See,
e.g., Regina v. Finta, Supreme Ct. of Canada, para. 293-94
(March 24, 1994) (La Forest, J., dissenting)
[254] Prosecutor v.
Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case no. ICTR-95-1-T, para. 133-34 (ICTR
Trial Chamber, May 21, 1999). Crimes against humanity covers both
state and non-state actors. Id. at para. 125-26.
[255] International
Criminal Court, supra note 126 , at Art. 30(2)(a), (b).
[256] Id. at
Art. 30(3).
[257]
International Criminal Court
Elements, supra note 234 , at 61.
[258]Id.
[259] International
Criminal Court, supra note 126 , at Art. 28(2)(a), (b), (c).
[260] In Re
Yamishita, 327 U.S. 1, 12 (1946) (affirming the conviction of the
General where he did not take adequate measures to control his
troops).
[261] G.A. Res. 203,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/203, at 2 (1995).
[262] ICCPR, supra
note 148 , at Art. 12(4).
[263] See
International Criminal Court
Elements, supra note 234 , at 742.
[264] Prosecutor v.
Tadic, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, para. 644 (ICTY App. Chamber
Oct. 2, 1995).
[265]
International Criminal Court
Elements, supra note 234 , at 742 n.12.
[266]
Human Rights Watch,
supra note 15 , at 80.
[267]
International Criminal Court
Elements, supra note 234 , at 742.
[268] Id. at
87.
[269]
Human Rights Watch,
supra note 15 , at 79.
[270] Knowles,
supra note 15 , at 154.
[271]
International Criminal Court
Elements, supra note 234 , at 87.
[272]
Iraqi National Congress,
supra note 32 , at 68.
[273] Id. at
57.
[274] Human Rights
Questions, supra note 207 , at 49.
[275] ICCPR, supra
note 148 , at Art. 9.
[276] Id. at
Art. 14.
[277] See
International Criminal Court
Elements, supra note 234 , at 743.
[278]
International Criminal Court
Elements, supra note 234 , at 743; Prosecutor v.
Kronojelac, Case No. IT-97-25, para. 115 (ICTY Trial Chamber, Mar.
15, 2002).
[279]
International Criminal Court
Elements, supra note 234 , at 743; Prosecutor
v. Kronojelac, Case No. IT-97-25, para. 115 (ICTY Trial Chamber,
Mar. 15, 2002).
[280]
International Criminal Court
Elements, supra note 234 , at 89.
[281] Prosecutor v.
Kronojelac, Case No. IT-97-25, para. 115, 302-03 (ICTY Trial
Chamber, Mar. 15, 2002).
[282] See
International Criminal Court Elements, supra note 234
, at 743.
[283] Prosecutor v.
Kronojelac, Case No. IT-97-25, para. 115 (ICTY Trial Chamber, Mar.
15, 2002).
[284] See ICCPR,
supra note 148 .
[285] Id. at
Art. 14 (1).
[286] The specific
deprivations are explained in Part II.B.1.
[287] Amnesty
International Report 2002, supra note 54 , at 2.
[288] Id.
[289] Id.
[290] United Nations
officials included Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human
Rights, along with the Rapporteur on Torture and the Rapporteur on
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions.
[291] Id. at 7.
[292] Human Rights
Questions, supra note 272, at 24.
[293] Id.
[294] Human Rights
Questions, supra note 274 , at 24-25.
[295] See
Prosecutor v. Naletilic and Martinovic, Case No. IT-98-34, para. 247
(ICTY Trial Chamber, Mar. 31, 2003). “Article 5(i) of the Statute
(other inhumane acts) is a residual clause, which applies to acts
that do not fall within any of other sub-clause of Article 5 of the
Statute but are sufficiently similar in gravity to the other
enumerated crimes.” Inhumane acts are “acts or omissions intended to
cause deliberate mental or physical suffering to the individual. As
constituting crimes against humanity, these acts must also be
widespread or systematic.” Id.
[296] Prosecutor v.
Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, para. 148-151 (ITCR
Trial Chamber, May 21, 1999).
[297] Prosecutor v.
Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, para. 148-151 (ITCR
Trial Chamber, May 21, 1999).
[298] See
Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, para.
148-151 (ITCR Trial Chamber, May 21, 1999).
[299] Prosecutor v.
Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, para. 232 (ICTR Trial Chamber, Jan.
27, 2000).
[300] Prosecutor v.
Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, para. 153 (ITCR Trial
Chamber, May 21, 1999). “[T]o find an accused responsible for [third
party suffering] under crimes against humanity, it is incumbent on
the Prosecutor to prove the mens rea on the part of the
accused.” Id. “[I]nhumane acts are . . . those which
deliberately cause serious mental suffering.” Id. The
mens rea is “the intention to inflict serious mental suffering
on the third party, or where the accused knew that his act was
likely to cause serious mental suffering and was reckless as to
whether such suffering would result.” Id. Consequently, “if
at the time of the act, the accused was unaware of the third party
bearing witness to his act, then he cannot be held responsible for
the mental suffering of the third party.” Id.
[301] Case No.
ICTR-96-14, para. 465, 467 (Trial Chamber, May 16, 2003).
[302] Case No.
IT-98-32-T, para. 234 (ICTY Trial Chamber, Nov. 29, 2002).
[303] Id. at
para. 235.
[304] Id.
[305] See supra
Part II.B.2 (detailing the excessive punishment decrees).
[306] See ICCPR,
supra note 148 , at Art. 7.
[307] Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights, General Comment 20: Replaces
General Comment 7 Concerning Prohibition of Torture and Cruel
Treatment or Punishment, Art. 7, 44th Sess., at 5 (1992),
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(symbol)/CCPR+General+comment+20.En?OpenDocument
[hereinafter Torture Convention Comment 20].
[308] Amnesty
International, supra note 47 , at 3-4.
[309] Id. at 2
(emphasis added).
[310] See ICCPR,
supra note 148 , at Art. 6(2).
[311] ICTY Statute,
supra note 131 , art. 5(f).
[312] ICTR Statute,
supra note 131 , art. 3(f).
[313] Allied Control
Council Law supra note 162 , art. II(1)(c).
[314] International
Criminal Court, supra note 126 , at Art. 7(2)(e).
[315] Id.
(broadly defining torture as “intentional infliction of severe pain
or suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a person in the
custody or under the control of the accused.”)
[316] Torture
Convention, supra note 89 .
[317] ICCPR, supra
note 148 .
[318] See
Torture Convention Comment 20, supra note 307 .
[319] Prosecutor v.
Kunarac, Kovac and Vokovic, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1, para.
142 (Appeals Chamber, June 12, 2002); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case
No. ICTR-96-4-T, para. 593-95 (ICTR Trial Chamber, Sept. 2, 1998).
The Chamber, in Prosecutor v. Semanza noted that no “public
official requirement exists.
In Akayesu, the Trial Chamber
relied on the definition of torture found in the . . . Convention
Against Torture . . . . The ICTY Appeals Chamber has since explained
that while the definition contained in the Convention Against
Torture is reflective of customary international law . . . , it is
not identical to the definition of torture as a crime against
humanity. [T]he ICTY Appeals Chamber has confirmed that, outside the
framework of the Convention Against Torture, the ‘public official’
requirement is not a requirement under customary international law
in relation to individual criminal responsibility for torture as a
crime against humanity. Case
No. ICTR-97-20, para. 342-43 (ICTR Trial Chamber, May 15, 2003).
Thus, the Chamber rejected the ‘public official’ requirement.
[320] Prosecutor v.
Kunarac, Kovac and Vokovic, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1, para.
142 (Appeals Chamber, June 12, 2002); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case
No. ICTR-96-4-T, para. 593-95 (ICTR Trial Chamber, Sept. 2, 1998).
[321] Prosecutor v.
Kunarac, Kovac and Vokovic, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1, para.
142 (Appeals Chamber, June 12, 2002); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case
No. ICTR-96-4-T, para. 593-95 (ICTR Trial Chamber, Sept. 2, 1998).
[322] Torture
Convention Comment 20, supra note 307 , at 2.
[323] Id. at 3.
[324] Id. at 8.
[325] Id. at 5.
[326] Id. at 6.
[327] Id. at
15.
|
|
|
© 2005 Boalt Journal of Criminal Law, All Rights Reserved
Current Issue║
Archive
|